Football's Magic Money Tree

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Chester Perry
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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Sat Mar 12, 2022 2:07 am

The us a long and dense academic article fro, Simon Chadwick that effectively serves as a condensed overview of all the content I have posted from him on this thread - It argues that there is a an urgent need for a different approach to understanding sport and it's role,

From utilitarianism and neoclassical sport management to a new geopolitical economy of sport
Simon ChadwickORCID Icon
Received 24 May 2021, Accepted 18 Jan 2022, Published online: 11 Feb 2022

ABSTRACT
Research question
In a fast-changing world, this study poses a simple question: is it time to start looking at sport in a different way? Thus far, utilitarian and neoclassical economic thinking has dominated sport management scholarship; however, here it is asked: should scholars now be thinking in terms of a new geopolitical economy of sport?

Research methods
This is a commentary paper based upon pieces of literature drawn from sport management, geography, politics and economics.

Results and findings
The submission contends that scholarly activity in sport needs to be reoriented towards a new perspective – the geopolitical economy of sport. Whilst not dismissing the relevance of existing utilitarian or neoclassical perspectives, it is argued in this study that how scholars conventionally view sport must change to maintain the relevance of their research and scholarship.

Implications
In addition to exploring the implications of conceiving sport as a geopolitical economy, the following five areas are identified in which there are significant implications (hence further research is needed):

Sport as an outcome of geography;

Sport as a focus for soft power, diplomacy and trade;

Sport as a networked geopolitically economic activity;

Sport as the basis for achieving national competitive advantage;

Sport as a means of acquiring resources.

Introduction
The world today is encountering profound, epochal giga-changes, especially rapid developments in digital technology (Rindfleisch, 2020); globalisation and shifts in global economic power (Schulenkorf & Frawley, 2016); challenges to the established international political order (Balaam & Dillman, 2018); and environmental concerns and degradation of the natural environment (McCullough et al., 2020). The effects of these giga-changes can be observed in the ways that markets are functioning (Schutz, 2016), governments are creating policy (Fels et al., 2012), and consumers are living their lives (Jones et al., 2017). In turn, new types of organisations are emerging, new leadership and management practices are being established, and the orthodoxies of many industries are now being challenged. No human existence is being left untouched by a time that will be viewed in retrospect as one of the most important periods in human history (Simon, 2019).

These giga-changes inevitably impact sport, including how it is broadcast (Hutchins et al., 2019), who invests in it and why (Koba, 2021), and the convergence of sport with other sectors (such as entertainment) (Carter, 2010). As such, this paper contends that sport is now much changed and continuing to change, from, as we have known it over the last one hundred and fifty years. This renders impotent existing ways of theorising about and researching in sport, especially among those in the academic community who have identified themselves as working in ‘sport management’, over the last four decades,. This paper will highlight that such impotence is most commonly observed in work focused on global aspects of sport and elite professional sport. However, there have also been, for example, changes in sport consumer attitudes and behaviours, sport policies and industrial strategy in sport, and investments made in grassroots and amateur sports. It also extends to athletes, participants, fans and other human involvement in sport, all of whom are embedded within and reflect the contexts within which they are located. This necessitates that scholars and researchers, at the very least, broaden their view of what sport is, what it can achieve, and how it is deployed. Readers need to note that what is advocated here is essentially an ideological standpoint that challenges the prevailing ideological hegemony that is commonly observed in the sport management literature.

Established notions of sport management are thus increasingly challenged indeed one argues that they are no longer fit for purpose in the twenty-first century. This necessitates that how to conceive of sport better must be developed to better reflect our changing world. The main purpose of this paper is to propose an alternative view of sport, which will provide the platform upon which a new body of work can be built. Hence, the question underpinning this paper is, at one level: is it time to start looking at sport in a different way? At another level, a second question is posed: should scholars now be thinking in terms of a new geopolitical economy of sport?

Utilitarianism and sport
Although sport has been evident across human history, the foundations of the modern sport were established (Vamplew, 2017) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The origins and global popularity of football were forged during this time, the industrial revolution prompting the foundation of many clubs that remain popular today (Lanfranchi & Roach, 2017). This resulted in the formal codification of football, resulting in league structures and cup competitions being created (Collins, 2015). Ultimately, it led to the constitution of the Federation Internationale de Football Association in 1904, followed in 1930 by the staging of football’s first World Cup. Yet it was not just the development of football that characterised this period in sport’s history. The International Olympic Committee was set up in 1894, the first Tour de France was staged in 1903, and the inaugural Wimbledon tennis tournament was staged in 1877. Many of the teams, clubs, leagues, events and associated organisations from this period exist even today. It is also important to note that many of these entities were set up in Europe; indeed, countries, such as Switzerland, retain their global prominence, in this case as the location for many of world sport’s governing bodies. European sporting pre-eminence during this period reflected the continent’s economic and political influence. The industrial revolution emerged from technological developments in Germany, Italy and Great Britain. At the same time, others, including Spain, Belgium and Portugal, were building colonial empires. These expansionary acts were driven by geographic and strategic motives, which resulted in such countries establishing social and cultural influence. For example, in India – a former British colony – cricket has become embedded in the country’s psyche.

Sport, as many people worldwide now know it, which forms the basis upon which research in the field commonly referred to as ‘sport management’ is undertaken, emerged during this period. Papers published on events, such as the Olympic Games or football’s World Cup, and those that focus on competition design, governance and fandom, typically have their origins in the prevailing ideology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Gold & Gold, 2011). This was a period during which utilitarian views of the world prevailed. The central tenet of this is that we should bring about a world in which every individual has the highest possible level of well-being. Alternatively stated, Bentham, Malthus and Mill see utilitarianism as entailing the pursuit of the greatest good for the greatest number (Cremaschi, 2004; Crimmins, 2017; Viner, 1949). At the heart of framing the world in this way is the notion that collectivism rather than individualism should underpin decisions and actions (Chandler, 1973). Health, lifestyle and community are fundamental to human activity (Crisp, 1992). One interpretation is that utilitarianism is concomitant with Christianity and muscularity (Parker & Watson, 2014), which emphasises the significance of citizenship, responsibility and physical fitness. Sports studies, such as sociology, policy and development, and history, appear to have their roots in the proselytising of utilitarianism. One could make the same claim about certain strands within the field of what subsequently became ‘sport management’. For instance, work emphasising matters pertaining to governance, corporate social responsibility, and notions of collective fandom, all have utilitarian DNA. There are even studies in contemporary sport management – such as Schneider (2010) - which explicitly reference the on-going significance of utilitarian views of sport. Whilst this provides some evidence of its continuing reach, utilitarianism’s European foundations must also be noted. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the continent’s significant influence in shaping modern sport was obvious. However, more than a century has passed since then, raising fundamental questions about the contemporary relevance of work built upon utilitarian principles. As the United States ascended and Europe’s economic and political power diminished, an alternative ideology emerged and ultimately began to dominate, whilst new technologies (perhaps most notably in sports broadcasting) were developed. This rendered utilitarianism impotent in explaining an ideology that came to emphasise individual, private interests and gain alongside the importance of business and profit.

Neoclassicism and sport
It was not until 1949 that the National Basketball Association merged with the Basketball Association of America and the National Basketball League to form what is now known as the NBA. Significantly, the competition was instigated, unlike clubs and leagues in Europe, to ensure financial viability and commercial success. Whilst the development of European sport had been socially democratic and largely unregulated, corporate involvement in US sport resulted in closed leagues, salary caps and a draft system is employed as a means through which to govern the sport and ensure financial sustainability. The US neoclassical model became firmly established by the middle part of the twentieth century. At the same time, the allied victory in World War 2 and subsequent post-war settlements (for example, Bretton Woods in 1944 and foundation of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation in 1948 – later to become the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) were instrumental in enabling a new world order in which liberal, free market capitalism came to the fore and began to impose itself globally. As business and markets flourished, a commercial focus developed across US sport, stimulating the growth of activities including sponsorships, merchandising, naming rights, and broadcasting deals. By the last quarter of the twentieth century, these activities had become so pervasive and such a powerful influence upon the global sport that teams, clubs, leagues, competitions and events across the world we’re operating in a way that has drawn heavily from the North American neoclassical model of the sport.

Whilst European economic and political influence endured through to the late twentieth century, the United States’ growing economic, political and ideological strength during the first quarter of the century was striking. The country’s growing influence became pervasive, driven by new technology, inventiveness, an entrepreneurial spirit and a strong business focus. This resulted in developments including radio, television and the mass production of motor vehicles. Such dynamism ultimately came to dominate world affairs for the remainder of the century, boosted by the country’s economic performance and political strength and the ultimate fall of communism in the 1990s. At that time, commentators observed how, in essence, capitalism and liberal Western ideology had triumphed (Macey & Miller, 1992). This supposed victory was instigated then sustained by adhering to neoclassical economic principles (Henry, 2012), which was founded upon classical economics (Aspromourgos, 1999). The classicism of this nature emerged from the industrial revolution and the rise of capitalism and was centred upon the importance of production, trade and growth (Hennings & Samuels, 2012). In turn, income generation and its management became an inevitable outcome of their interconnections (Hunt, 2000). The twentieth century re-imagining classicism as neoclassicism emphasised the role that free market capitalism should play in making choices – economic, societal, environmental and otherwise (Bowles, 1991). Central to the effective operations of markets are buyers and sellers – demand and supply; and for markets to function effectively, perfect competition demands that they are unencumbered by regulatory interventions (Swanson, 2007). In such circumstances, proponents of this ideological stance argue that efficient resource allocation can only occur when it is driven by private interest (collective interests being thought to hinder and distort the functioning of markets) and rewarded by profit (Scapens, 1978). Capitalism promoted the development of business and changed patterns of industrial development across a multiplicity of sectors. It also prompted the rise of managerialism; for markets to function effectively, the production needed to be organised efficiently, whilst consumer demands needed to be anticipated, met or deliberately shaped by businesses and their managers (Epstein, 2007). Unlike utilitarianism, the development of neoclassicism was founded upon individual units of production and consumption – in essence, it is a micro-level discipline with macro-level considerations (such as the government) seen as it is of secondary importance.

The overwhelming majority of sport management research and publication with which many working in sport are now familiar was the result of this period in history. Studies in this field, no matter how they are conceived of or framed, betray their neoclassical origins. The oldest journals in sport management were largely instigated in North America. The Journal of Sport Management was established by American and Canadian scholars, who were prominent contributors to JSM when it was first established and later embraced by others – initially Europeans and Australians, then others worldwide. Neoclassical papers in sport management have typically focused upon topics ranging from sponsorship and public relations to financial accounting, fan engagement, managing consumer experiences and more. This subsequently spawned a profusion of journals, conferences and other publishing outlets in numerous countries, underpinning neoclassical principles that emphasised managerialism, commercialisation and industrialisation. The remnants of utilitarianism have doggedly remained attached to sport management research, especially in contexts such as studies of European football (see Parker et al., 2019, as an illustration of this), but the reality is that for half a century the sport management community has been labouring on behalf of neoclassical, capitalist ideology. This has served many scholars well, establishing and embedding the field as an important one at many different levels. University research centres academic journals (including European Sport Management Quarterly), conferences, and undergraduate and postgraduate programmes have flourished during the period. Not only has the scholarly community responded to the needs of neoclassical orthodoxy and ideology, it has also prepared students well for the world of neoclassical sport, and has firmly embedded itself as a legitimate member of the academic and industrial communities.

However, there is something distinctly late twentieth century about the established conceptualisation of sport management, as it continues under the illusion that the Western capitalist, free-market model remains the dominant global paradigm (in sport and more generally). Although advocates of sport management will point to the ever-proliferating number of publication outlets and the discipline’s ability to adapt and respond (for instance, explaining the digitalisation of sport), an argument could be that sport management is past its prime, and no longer adequately explains sport in the twenty-first century. Some who have prospered under sport management’s fifty-year dominance, especially those in certain geographic locations who believe that free, unfettered markets really exist (and are a good thing), will no doubt recoil from such an assessment, indeed they may feel affronted and even outright reject it. However, one seeks to clarify this statement in several ways. Piketty (2018) has questioned the assumptions about the essentialness and positive outcomes from the competition. The world has profoundly changed even in just the last twenty years; indeed advocates of a victory for capitalism observed in the 1990s by those such as Francis Fukuyama (2006) have been widely condemned as being wrong (for example, see Williams et al., 2016). Recent global change has challenged all aspects of the liberal order imposed upon global institutions by the West following World War 2; for instance, the rules-based order, which even in sport is being replaced by deals (Chomsky, 1999) and the emergence of new global institutions (Ikenberr, 2014).

To further illustrate one’s scepticism about sport management’s capacity to cope with the world’s new reality, the reader is asked to consider Russia’s Gazprom (Chadwick, 2015a). Its origins are as a Russian state-owned oil and gas producer, which in the early nineties was privatised under the programme of Perestroika (Rosner, 2006). For a while, oil and gas markets in the former Soviet Union were liberalised though once Vladimir Putin became president of Russia, Gazprom (as it is now known) was essentially renationalised and now serves the needs of the state. Subsequently, Gazprom became a sponsor of the UEFA Champions League (and the German Bundesliga’s FC Schalke 04); the corporation’s president Alexander Dyukov even sits on UEFA’s Executive Committee. Unlike other sponsors – such as McDonalds, Coca Cola or Mastercard – Gazprom’s relationship with UEFA is neither a B2C (business-to-consumer) nor a B2B (business-to-business) deal. Instead, it is best characterised as a G2G (government-to-government) deal, enabled by the diplomatic and networking opportunities that the Champions League matches (Chadwick, 2021). To some, this could seem trivial; however, it needs to be set in the context of United States sanctions against Gazprom amid warnings from Washington that Germany’s dependence upon Russian gas constitutes a major strategic threat to European security (Krickovic, 2015). Such is the network of economic, political and strategic factors within which Gazprom’s sponsorships are embedded (Jirušek & Kuchyňková, 2018) that the existing sport management literature (in this case, specifically in sponsorship) is ill-equipped to explain such contemporary developments.

A new geopolitical economy of sport
In observing sport during the first quarter of the twenty-first century, one can still see the contemporary intersection of utilitarianism and neoclassicism, that is of sport which is influenced by different ideologies and competing perspectives. For instance, during the early part of 2021, twelve European football clubs revealed proposals to break away from UEFA’s existing Champions League structure and its attendant system of governance by establishing a Super League (The Economist, 2021). The clubs’ motives were underpinned by the principles of free-market capitalism, whereby profitability is the ultimate arbiter of an organisation’s operations, indeed its existence. Nevertheless, the proposal caused a huge outcry amongst Europeans, particularly fans, who were driven by a sense of community and identity, underpinned by notions of history and heritage, and resentment about the ideological dominance of North America and its sport. Nevertheless, in this episode were some significant stakeholders. One of the clubs, Italy’s Internazionale of Milan, was then owned by a Chinese high street electrical retailer. Another, the English Premier League’s Chelsea, was owned by a Russian oligarch from Siberia. In a further instance, Manchester City of England was owned by an Abu Dhabi state investment vehicle which had used the club as the basis for opening multiple franchises across countries, including India, China and Japan. Rumours have circulated that the Super League itself was planning to use funding from Saudi Arabia to establish the league and award prize money to the participants. Elsewhere, the Chinese government has envisioned itself becoming the world’s largest domestic sport economy by 2025. Hence, the country has enacted policy and created a programme of investments that has embraced everything from event hosting and stadium construction to the acquisition of overseas sports assets and the development of new broadcasting services (Chadwick, 2015b).

On this basis (and in the context of the giga-changes noted above), this paper advocates the necessity for the sport community to change its utilitarian-neoclassical framing of sport. Moving forward from here, one contends that sport must be viewed and researched in terms of a geopolitical economy. To begin with, it is worthwhile deconstructing this notion into its constituent parts: geography, politics and economics. Geography, in broad terms, can be viewed as essentially being composed of two elements: human geography and physical geography (Goudie, 1986). Throughout this paper, repeated references have been made to countries, places and people, commonly associated with human geography (Marston et al., 2005). For this analysis, physical geography is conceived of as country features and natural resource endowments, and the environmental challenges the planet faces (which one might alternatively label ‘sustainability’) (Petersen et al., 2016). With globalisation, the rise of Asia and the democratising effects of digital technology, sport is facing new and intriguing human challenges – such as the sport and entertainment convergence we are witnessing worldwide (Carter, 2010). Yet the physical environment poses some equally interesting, at times urgent, challenges (not least environmental change and the need to eliminate carbon dependence). For instance, nations in the Gulf region (Qatar and Abu Dhabi being two notable examples) have sought to address their geographic insecurities by engaging natural resource endowments (specifically oil and gas deposits and their attendant revenues), which they have sought to achieve by investments in sport (Reiche, 2015). For example, three of the Gulf Cooperation Council members now host F1 Grand Prix, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates run professional cycling teams, and European football clubs, such as Manchester City and Paris Saint Germain, are owned by state entities from the region. Geography plays an important role across many aspects of the sport; as such, there is evidence of a growing interest in the role the discipline plays in examining sport at various levels (Ilieș et al., 2014).

Popular interpretations of politics are typically associated with how countries and areas are governed (Leftwich, 2015). Such interpretations are typically laden with notions of power, control and contesting (Barnett & Duvall, 2005), which are associated with the role that states, governments and private institutions play in battling for dominance (Migdal, 2018). Dominance can manifest in many ways, including over territories, resources, economic activity, narrative and discourse and, also sport (Sparke, 2004). There is an oft-stated view that politics and sport don’t mix; however, especially given the contemporary global environment, this is an impossibly naïve and simplistic view. Indeed, sport is increasingly being employed and deployed as a means to pursue other ends and assert power and achieve dominance in the sport itself (Burnett, 2001). Over the last decade, China has used a policy of stadium diplomacy in Africa to secure preferential access to natural resources (Dubinsky, 2021; Will, 2012). Initiated and led by the Chinese government, stadiums are gifted or funded through soft loans (provided at significantly below market interest rates). China’s goal is to secure the natural resources needed to sustain its long-term economic development. Equally, the United States government’s use of basketball diplomacy has become a feature of the international relations landscape in Africa, India and elsewhere in the world. Ideologically, one can also see that the geopolitical economy of the sport becoming manifest in human resources. For instance, how Colin Kaepernick, taking a knee and links to sponsorships have been enabled by and reflect Western values stands in stark contrast to how female tennis player Peng Shuai’s social media post about sexual indiscretions perpetrated by a state official were handled.

Contrary to popular opinion, the essence of economics is not about understanding how to make money; it focuses on the choices that people, organisations, governments and states all make (Backhouse & Medema, 2009). As such, economics examines how resources are allocated, and how production, distribution and consumption decisions are made (Cohen & Cyert, 1965). Fundamentally, economics consists of two strands: micro and macro. Microeconomics is associated with neoclassicism (through its analysis of individuals, households and firms) (Dopfer et al., 2004). Macroeconomics alternatively focuses on economic systems and how production, consumption, savings and investment interact. Therefore, it emphasises the importance of resource deployment and utilisation, economic growth, and the impact that public policy has upon economic systems and those entities that are actors within them. Macroeconomics is omnipotent; hence, this paper asserts that an understanding of work in this field will help the sport community better understand the industry, its challenges, and the decisions that need to be made. For instance, in Israel, the government seeks to establish the country as an important global hub for the development of sports technology, which, it anticipates, will help the country build competitive advantage and help generate productive capacity, employment, trade opportunities, fiscal benefits and political influence (Dubinsky, 2020). Another illustration of the economic importance of sport as an economic choice is evident among rentier states, which generate rents externally by manipulating global political and/or economic environments. Saudi Arabia is an example of a rentier state (Baumann, 2019). Its current sport investment programme is a conscious attempt to diversify its economy away from oil and gas dependence by incentivising international sporting events to be staged in the kingdom (Chadwick & Widdop, 2018).

In combination, the elements of geography, politics and economy accentuate the importance of and interplay between territory, power and choices. As has been emphasised across this paper, this interplay is becoming pervasive in sport, demanding that scholarly analysis needs to move on from its increasingly misplaced obsession with neoclassicism. Further justification for such a shift is provided by an established body of work in geopolitics, which is centred upon the struggle over the control of geographical entities with an international and global dimensionand the use of such geographical entities for political advantage (Flint, 2016). Betraying economic dimensions of choice, geopolitics asks several key questions, including: How should countries interact with one another? How are countries made through the politics of nationalism? How is the geographical extent of countries defined? How do state and non-state actors operate through territorial and network strategies? How should state and non-state actors make decisions in the context of environmental changes? (Flint, 2016) Significantly, geopolitics advocates the need for network analyses as the basis for understanding geopolitical realities, something far removed from micro-level neoclassical approaches to understanding the world. Alongside the literature on geopolitics, there is extant literature in political economy, which addresses interactions between political and economic processes within society. In particular, the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time are seen as key challenges for the discipline (Woodley, 2015). Collinson (2003) highlights the challenge facing political economy, which addresses real-world problems in ways that emphasise the connections between economic problems, social structures and political processes. In particular, by answering the following questions: What is happening? Why? Who gains and who loses? Does it matter? And, if so, what can be done and by whom? In emergent work on the geopolitical economy, Desai (2013) identifies that it signifies the politico-economic actions of states, dominant and contender states, particularly at the international and global levels.

There is great resonance for sport in the twenty-first century among these questions. States, governments and related entities are engaged in using their geographies, resource endowments and politico-economic characteristics to build power and exert control within and out with sport (for instance, see Chadwick’s, 2019a, assessment of Japan’s pivot towards sport). This means that the desire to win on the field is increasingly paralleled by a desire to win off it. Equally, winning in sport and winning through sport is also connected. China’s government has stated that it wants the country to become a leading FIFA nation by 2050 (Chadwick, 2015c). Many observers have characterised this as an intention on China’s part to win the men’s World Cup, which is potentially beneficial to the nation in many ways. However, the country’s vision, when framed in geopolitical terms, can be interpreted in a different way. For instance, Chinese corporations are an increasingly dominant presence in FIFA’s portfolio of sponsors. Indeed, the FIFA president has publicly acknowledged the financial stability that money from China has brought to the organisation (Press Association, 2016). Strategically, this has created a resource-dependent relationship between FIFA and China, enabling the latter to exert a degree of power and control over the former. It seems likely that this will be used as the foundation for a future Chinese World Cup hosting bid and to promote the politico-economic benefits that the government in Beijing is seeking to derive from being a host.

Drawing from the analysis provided in this paper, it is proposed that a new field of research is established – the geopolitical economy of sport – which is defined as

The way in which nations, states and other entities engage in, with, or through sport for geographic and politico-economic reasons in order to build and exert power, and secure strategic advantages through the control of resources within and via networks of which sport is a constituent part.

The domain of sport’s geopolitical economy is all-pervasive, encompassing sport at all levels and impacting policy, strategy, governance, marketing. Furthermore, on matters pertaining to, for example, transgender athletes, decolonisation and racism, analysing such phenomena in terms of geopolitical economy is important. For instance, China has recently sought to suppress LGBTQ+ rights, in terms of event staging and event sponsorship, have significant consequences, especially for Western sponsors engaged in China, whilst promote brand values globally that emphasise a commitment to LGBTQ+ rights. It seems inevitable that some will point to, say, Saudi Arabia’s aspiration to become an established mega-event destination or Qatar’s ownership of multiple sport assets as embodying the essence of this paper’s central proposition. However, China’s funding of community sports facilities in Africa or Great Britain’s spending on grassroots sport in other countries is manifestation of sport’s geopolitical economy. It is also important for readers to note that although one proposes here that geopolitical economy should displace neoclassicism and utilitarianism as the dominant paradigm in sport research, this does not negate the significance of management, governance, strategy, organisational behaviour, leadership and so forth. Sport as a geopolitical economy still requires good management. However, rather than being guided by neoclassical principles, the contention here is that managers exist within the environment of,and engage in activity driven by inter-related considerations of geography, politics and economics.

Implications for sport research
It would be rather presumptuous to suggest that sport in the twenty-first century has become entirely and exclusively geopolitically economic. However, today’s world is one in which 19th and 20th hegemonies have dissipated, meaning they are, thus, far less dominant. Rival ideologies now gain traction, which means that decisions to engage in sport management research (or, for that matter, research ingeopolitical economy and sport) requires that scholars and researchers are fully conversant with their choices and the effects this may have in terms of generating insights into the phenomena are explored. For instance, sponsorship research as it has been undertaken in the existing sport management literature remains relevant in many twentieth century, Western settings. However, it is much less robust in accounting for the sponsorship practices displayed by the twenty-first century, state-owned entities engaging in it. One hopes this paper provides some impetus for the emergence of a new body of work, identified as the geopolitical economy of sport. However, for those who continue to self-identify as sport management scholars, it is important that they engage with, understand and embrace the causes and effects of the giga-changes mentioned in their work. To help illustrate: the Gulf region’s three largest airlines – Emirates Airline, Etihad Airways and Qatar Airways – are all state-owned and annually receive considerable state subsidies, partly because their goals are often non-commercial in nature. Yet each of them retains an extensive sport sponsorship portfolio, characterised by rights acquisitions made at above-market rates and funded by what some see as illegal state aid. The sport management literature does not have an armoury that will enable it to convincingly or effectively address the challenges this illustration poses for sport.

As for sport, human contesting, playing games and engaging in physical activities are part of our DNA, which manifest themselves in various ways, including how people self-identify, one’s sense of place and belonging, and a person’s attitudes towards health and well-being. As such, the framing of sport as utilitarian by sport management researchers will continue to be of some relevance. Indeed, the field will no doubt still prompt studies in a diversity of areas ranging from attitudes towards fitness to the reasons why sports fans engage with a team, club or franchise. Even in a range of specific twenty-first century contexts and cultures, the residue of utilitarianism will endure. It is worth noting that of fewer countries staging annual national sports days, all are in Asia (for example, in Iran and Malaysia). These territories, with systems and policies, have helped give rise to the arguments presented here that sport research needs to switch from a neoclassical perspective towards a more geopolitical view of the world.

Equally, it is not the purpose of this paper nor the intention of its author to herald the death of the neoclassical foundations upon which much of the contemporary sport management literature is built. A large proportion of the studies being submitted to and published by journals in the field remain firmly rooted in liberal, free-market ideology, with a clear focus on matters on management and business. This closely aligns with the positioning and content of many university sport programmes worldwide, especially in the West. Although it reflects the nature of some developments in contemporary sport, which continues to accentuate a market-driven, commercially focused framing of research and publication. Yet utilitarianism and neoclassicism face an ideological challenge. This paper stops short of making such assertions, the author preferring instead to see sport as being connected to society, culture and business, though as a part of much wider networks of interconnecting relationships. These include important dimensions of geography, politics and economic activity – the new geopolitical economy of sport as it is expressed here throughout. In this context, and as a result, researchers and scholars in the field of what is known as ‘sport management’ are challenged to reframe their understanding of sport in a way that accounts for globalisation, the rise of Asia, digital technology, the use of sport as a means through which to pursue supra national goals, and competing global ideologies. In general terms, this implies a need for sport researchers to relinquish their micro-level fixation with sport favouring a new, macro-level view of sport. For those who are unclear about the difference between the two, such differences can also be observed in disciplines such as economics where micro-level studies focus on individuals and firms whereas macro-level studies examine economies, countries and global trade. There is already evidence that researchers in the field are embracing the notions of inter-country competitiveness (De Bosscher et al., 2015) and the networked nature of global sport (Babiak et al., 2018). Yet the intention is for this paper to serve as a clarion call for work of this nature to be more widely embraced. A simplified view of this might be that sport management scholars need to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach to their work. However, the geopolitical economy of sport demands that new world views are developedto develop an understanding of the connections between sport, music, fashion and politics (Chadwick & Widdop, 2021). There is also a need to bring business and management to politics, diplomacy and international relations (and vice versa).

More specifically (though not exhaustively), it is proposed that the following should provide a basis for those seeking to engage in research that can be labelled as sport’s geopolitical economy:

Sport as an outcome of geography

In examining literature pertaining to sport and geography, one is struck by the paucity of research connecting the two. This is surprising, as the sport is inextricably bound up with geography, whether in terms of consumption and production or notions of fandom, nationality and event staging. Some interesting developments take place in this field in environmental studies and sport, which have their origins in an understanding of geography (McCullough & Kellison, 2017). However, geography, as it is conceived of here, embodies fundamental elements of physical and human geographies. It is contended that each of these, separately and together, establish/es the parameters for sport in countries worldwide. Alternatively stated, sport is a response to the advantages and disadvantages faced by a country. To illustrate, consider the influx of investment into the global sport industry from the Gulf region over the last two decades. Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) are all endowed with significant oil and gas deposits, which has conferred significant wealth upon them. Accordingly, we have seen considerable investments being made by these nations in sports infrastructure, event hosting, team formation and overseas sports assets (from horse racing and powerboat racing to cycle teams and football clubs) (Chadwick, 2019b). Other geographies that underpin and help explain some countries’ prominent roles in sport are Britain’s island status, colonial ambitions and the consequent impact this has had upon world sports, such as cricket and rugby; and Japan’s strategic position in the Pacific, which led to the United States’ influence upon the country and the resultant popularisation of baseball. However, it is Qatar’s vulnerable geographic position and the way that the government in Doha has used sport as means by which to boost its profile, presence, legitimacy and security, whilst serving to diversify its economy away from oil and gas dependence that epitomise the significance of geography for this paper (as background and to fully understand this point, it is recommended that readers familiarise themselves with Qatar’s position on a map) (Kamrava, 2015). Based on the above, the following research questions are presented as opportunities for further development of research in this sphere:

 − In what ways does geography impact sport, and with what implications for organisations, leadership, management and decision-making?

 − What geographic features of a country give rise to sport becoming an important element in a country’s policy, strategy and thinking in general?

 − How will changes in the natural environment, notably climate change, shape and influence sport?

Sport as a focus for soft power, diplomacy and trade

Notions of soft power and diplomacy through sport have become ubiquitous over the last decade (the likes of Koch, 2018; Rofe, 2016), with the former term now routinely used in popular discourse about sport. For instance, Chinese sport policy since 2015 has sometimes been framed by some Western commentators as an exercise in soft power projection (Liu, 2020). Similar statements have also been made about countries like Saudi Arabia, which raises an interesting point for debate. Whilst the government in Riyadh is actively seeking to leverage the effects of soft power, some critics label this as sports washing – a means by which a country can deflect audiences’ attention away from less favourable perceptions of a country via a programme of investment in sport. The significant dearth of studies in sport examining sports washing is particularly notable, especially as many countries are accused without proof. Furthermore, views of sport washing appear to be culturally prescribed, with nations in the West using such conceptions as the basis for casting judgement upon countries that are sometimes ideologically and morally opposed to them. Nevertheless, if one examines rankings of soft power, it is clear that nations, such as Britain, France and Germany, have become particularly adept at boosting their global soft power through sport. France’s victory in the 2018 FIFA World Cup Final is even specified as a factor contributing to the country’s soft power ascent (Portland Communications, 2019). Soft power is sometimes viewed as somewhat nebulous and intangible, yet there is often a bottom-line underpinning it. Indeed, the British government uses sport to drive diplomatic and trade relationships, using football as the basis for constructing a British national brand. Inbound investment, overseas sales and the consequent economic benefits associated with them are at the heart of this (Chadwick, 2016). Diplomacy has long been part of the sport landscape, with ping-pong and basketball diplomacy being two obvious instances. More recently, China has used policies of the stadium and sponsorship diplomacy as the means through which to achieve many outcomes. One of these is influence over sports governing bodies, with sponsorship contracts seemingly being used to create a financial dependence, something then closely linked to the power and influence China has sought to exert inside these governing bodies. To further illustrate this point, it is worth noting the consequences that a military skirmish (in which numerous soldiers were killed) on the India/China border in mid-2020 had for Premier League cricket in India. At that time, the competition had several Chinese sponsors, which subsequently withdrew from their deals as diplomatic tensions rose and Indian consumer sentiment began to turn against the Chinese brands in question (Chadwick, 2020a; Chadwick et al., 2020). In the sport management literature to date, there has been no concerted attempt to build a sustained or coherent body of work focused on this convergence of geographic, economic and political matters. Overall, this paper, therefore, proposes another set of research questions for sport scholars to contemplate:

 – How does the soft power role of sport impact its economic and political roles, and should the effects be measured?

 − In extending existing studies of sport and diplomacy, where are the opportunities to position the role of diplomacy as being an economic, industrial and commercial phenomenon?

 − What role does sport play in international trade, and what are the consequences of changes in the global trade environment for the geopolitical economy of sport?

Sport as a networked geopolitically economic activity

In literature pertaining to networks, sport has appeared regularly, including in studies of sponsorship (such as Chanavat et al., 2016), and digital technology (like Naraine, 2019). It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that a section of sport’s scholarly community is familiar with network-based research. Existing research seems to be largely located within domestic or micro-level contexts, with little attention paid to the transnational or global reach of such networks. Furthermore, network studies in sport have typically been unidimensional in nature, focusing on exchanges between dyads and nodes in these networks (for example, sponsor and sponsee). The world is, however, much more complex than existing network studies acknowledge or embrace which, during a time of international financial flows, transnational resource exchanges and globalised sport, means that it has been somewhat remiss of sport researchers not to have developed more elaborate studies in this sphere. Perhaps the embodiment of twenty-first century networked sport, City Football Group now owns or licences its name to football clubs in a double-digit number of territories. At one level, this network is intended to enable the timely identification, acquisition, development and disposal of playing talent and other human resources. At another level, CFG’s network enables the organisation’s Abu Dhabi state owners to engage in geopolitical and economic relationships. In one instance, CFG acquired a franchise club in Chengdu, China, which served as the basis for enhancing the state airline’s (Etihad) presence in East Asia (where Chengdu Airport is an important transit hub for the airline). At the same time, CFG’s ownership brings together organisations from China (China Media Capital) and the United States (Silver Lake) that have served to further the strategic interests of the organisation’s owners from the small Gulf State. In another instance, CFG acquired an Indian franchise club in Mumbai, not uncoincidentally the home of India’s film industry – commonly referred to as Bollywood at the same time as Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund (Mubadala) acquired a stake in a tech company, Reliance Jio, which is headquartered in Mumbai. Almost simultaneously, Silver Lake also purchased a stake in Reliance Jio, creating a network of interconnected investments linking the sport, entertainment and the digital technology sectors, and the strategic interests of an oil and gas-dependent Gulf state, private equity investment from the United States, and investments drawn from opaque Chinese sources (Chadwick, 2020b). The dense, transnational and scale of such networks, of which this is only one example, poses the following questions for researchers:

 − What is the nature, characteristics and scale of the networks that underpin global sport, and how should these be visualised and explained?

 − What factors determine the nature, size and shape of networks, and what significance do these factors have for sport on-the-field and off it?

 − Do different types of such networks in sport exist, and what does this mean for researching sport and for leading and managing within the sport?

Sport as the basis for achieving national and geopolitical competitive advantage

Sport and national competitive advantages have commonly and historically been framed in understanding how countries can secure an on-field advantage. Indeed, pieces of literature on managing performance and, more recently, on areas such as athlete analytics form the basis for understanding how to build the athletic, competitive advantage of nations. However, as Porter (2011) indicates, competitive advantage in sport can also be built off-field. In one sense, this remains a distinctly neoclassical notion, as annual league tables (published by outlets such as Forbes) of financial performance and brand value highlight. Nevertheless, the politico-economic impacts a country’s team, club, league and event successes can have should not be underestimated; after all, the National Basketball Association, English Premier League and Ferrari Formula One team are all acknowledged as having soft power and nation branding effects for their respective countries (Freeman, 2012). However, in the way that countries envision sport, the policies and strategies they pursue, and the outcomes they seek broader, contemporary notions of national competitive advantage in sport need to be established. For instance, esports, countries, including South Korea and Denmark, have implemented state policies to establish themselves as global leaders in this fast-emerging industrial sector (Chadwick, 2020c). Similarly, Saudi Arabian government policy is currently focused upon positioning the country as a sport event destination, which is particularly manifesting itself in motorsport and combat sports. Similarly, reports published by the English Premier League in conjunction with consulting business EY (2019) highlight the importance of the competitive advantage built through football. In this context, the following questions are proposed as the basis for stimulating contributions to the geopolitical economy:

 − In geographic, political and economic terms, what constitutes national competitive advantage?

 − On what basis can a national competitive advantage in sport be created and sustained?

 − What challenges does establishing a national competitive advantage in sport pose for leaders, managers, and other decision-makers?

Sport as a means of acquiring resources

Two perspectives have had the potential to contribute to the development of sport management research, although neither has attracted the sustained attention of researchers. These perspectives are resource-based theory and the competitive advantage of nations (a notion addressed above). Resource-based theory (for example, see Franco & Haase, 2017) addresses how valuable, rare resources, which cannot be imitated and substituted, can be acquired and deployed in ways that enable firms to achieve superior performance and establish a competitive advantage. The competitive advantage of nations (Porter, 2011) asserts that national prosperity is created, not inherited, concluding that nations have become more, not less, important. This perspective emphasises the importance of national values, culture, economic structures, political institutions, and histories, highlighting that successful countries are forward-looking and dynamic. However, neither of these two perspectives has ever gained traction in the collective imagination of sport researchers, even though both could have helped explain the strength of nations and businesses engaged in sport. In sport’s geopolitical economy, the relevance of both may nevertheless become more apparent and potentially more pressing. In traditional economic terms, there are essentially four types of resource: land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship. Identifying, acquiring and deploying resources are fundamental to economic systems, countries, governments, businesses and other organisations (Le Billon, 2017). Whether it is sporting success or other types of sporting performance success, such as employment creation or generation of export earnings, building strategic and competitive advantage in and through sport is increasingly important. Several nations are engaged in athlete harvesting (otherwise sometimes referred to as athlete naturalisation), one being Qatar, as the basis for populating and enhancing their national teams. With this in mind, a final set of research questions is offered for researchers to reflect upon:

 − To what extent can resource theories and/or theories of national competitive advantage be utilised as the basis for understanding sport’s twenty-first century geopolitical economy?

 − What issues and challenges do the transnational acquisition and deployment of resources pose for global sport?

 − Given the role being played by states in acquiring resources in or through sport, what are the ramifications of this for the likes of clubs, sponsors, naming rights partners and other commercial organisations?

Conclusions
The world, and more specifically sport, in the twenty-first century, is encountering profound changes, which will shape human existence for at least the next fifty years if not to the end of the century. Global economic and political shifts are challenging the established Western order, power has begun to move beyond centres such as New York and London to Mumbai, Riyadh and Beijing. Other nations are also growing and becoming increasingly influential; Nigeria is now labelled as Africa’s first superpower, whilst Indonesia will soon become the world’s fifth-largest economy. With such shifts have come a challenge in prevailing ideologies, systems of government and institutions, and the rules-based order established by Western nations after the Second World War. At the same time, a digital revolution is building global interconnectivity while creating new production and consumption opportunities. After two decades of this revolution, digital technology has given globalisation a boost and driven some profound changes to economic systems, political relationships and how individuals, organisations and states engage with one another. The ever-present dangers of climate change and environmental degradation must not be forgotten either. Measures to address these problems will inevitably have to be collaborative and consensual, implying that networks, of which sport is part, will need to be engaged. Gone are the days of the zero environmental cost production and consumption models of sport, something that the new geopolitical economy of sport proposed here actually addresses. It is also worth remembering that the wealth of countries like Qatar is threatened by the pivot away from carbon fuels, which has prompted investments in sport as such countries look to diversify their economies.

With the world thus having changed significantly since the emergence of research and publication in sport management, academia needs to respond with some alacrity. The utilitarian and neoclassical foundations of studies in sport management are not dismissed here as now being outdated; indeed the extensive body of knowledge built over the last four decades will continue to form the basis for researchers and others to understand micro-level phenomena in sport. However, with the advent of a new geopolitical economy of sport, sport management needs to reposition, refocus, rename and move on from its European and North American origins. This is not meant to imply that an Asian conception of sport will necessarily come to dominate the field in coming years. Rather, one of this paper’s main takeaways is that global sport in its entirety is, to a greater or lesser extent, now impacted by the geopolitical economy – this is not about the disintegration of one country or ideology and the rise of another. However, it does necessitate that scholars, researchers and others in the field of sport should change how they see a discipline that has thus far broadly been framed as ‘sport management’. Issues and questions pertaining to the geopolitical economy of sport have been proposed in this paper, and one anticipates that further questions will emerge as a sport (and our understanding of it) develops in the second quarter of the twenty-first century. At the same time, in posing then answering such questions, scholars will also need to address how programmes of study are created and delivered. This is vital if students and future researchers are to be appropriately and robustly prepared for a new way of looking at sport and the environments in which they will be working. Whilst some people may feel threatened or disconcerted by the profound changes our sport community is now facing, one prefers to see this period as one of the most exciting in the field’s history. It allows the discipline to extend and move on from its origins and old certainties into new ways of seeing the world. Sport management – in neoclassical and utilitarian forms – is not dead although a new life is being breathed into our community and its work by a new geopolitical economy of sport.
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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Sat Mar 12, 2022 2:08 am

The references for the above article are here

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Sat Mar 12, 2022 7:43 pm

Jonathan Wilson in the Guardian asks one of the most pertinent question in football right now - some hope it is one the proposed new football regulator will answer

Roman Abramovich and Chelsea symbolise the rotten state of football
The Premier League is often a beautiful spectacle, but its thirst for success and wealth at all costs has tainted its spirit


Jonathan Wilson

Sat 12 Mar 2022 17.00 GMT

Imagine we were starting again. Imagine this was a world when professional sport was in its infancy and even the concept of a league was controversial in case it made people overprioritise winning. Imagine you had a vague sense the clubs in this new competition might represent their local areas, that they might come to fulfil some sort of community function. Who would you want running them?

Would it be a fabulously rich Russian who made his fortune exploiting the economic chaos that followed a period of political turmoil to buy up his country’s oil and gas reserves and who was accused – although he strenuously denied it – of having close ties to that country’s autocratic leader?

How about the investment fund of a Middle Eastern state that is engaged in a brutal war with one of its neighbours, the chair of which told the Atlantic this month that if he had ordered the murder of a journalist for a US newspaper, which he definitely didn’t because frankly this guy was small fry, his boys would have made a better job of it?

Or what about an investment group run by another member of a Middle Eastern royal family, whose purpose in investing in the club was, as a Human Rights Watch report had it, to “construct a public relations image of a progressive, dynamic Gulf state, which deflects attention from what is really going on in the country”?

Probably not. But then neither would it be a US family who saddled a club with £660m of debt as part of its takeover. Nor would it be a hedge fund that tried to trademark the name of the city and dabbled with destroying sporting structures stretching back more than a century for financial gain.

You would probably rule out tax exiles, absentee businessmen and entrepreneurs with links to oligarchs as well. Take out the professional gamblers, one of whom was named in the Panama Papers, and we are left with a TV chef (One is Fun?) – and there’s at least a small caucus thoroughly bored by Norwich’s pedestrian yo-yoing between the Championship and the Premier League.

Which brings us to a fundamental question: what is a good owner? For the most vocal, all that matters is how much money they spend. If there are any Chelsea fans who doubt Roman Abramovich has been a good owner they have been very quiet; the anger about the situation they find themselves in has been aimed at the government, not the former governor of Chukotka.

But the sanctions are a result of the same forces that allowed Abramovich to loan Chelsea £1.5bn, apparently with no view to it being paid back.

If you didn’t protest about the signing of Glen Johnson in 2003, can you really protest about the present restrictions? This is the deal clubs accept when they take the money. And while it’s certainly possible to sympathise with the fan who just wants to turn on the TV after a hard day’s work and watch their team or pop along to the Bridge and have a couple of pints without having to concern themselves with geopolitics, that feeling is strained by those who abuse MPs for raising questions about their owners on parliament or hound journalists (and, far worse, the widows of victims) for expressing concerns, or add the flags of authoritarian regimes to their Twitter bios.

But was Abramovich a good owner even in football terms? Much will depend what happens next. It may be, if a sale is quickly agreed and the new owner is similarly generous, that he can be regarded as having not only brought five Premier Leagues and two Champions Leagues, but as having permanently raised Chelsea’s level from stylish pretenders to undoubted giants. It’s also possible, though, that he could become a luxury version of Sacha Gaydamak, under whom Portsmouth won the FA Cup but slipped into financial problems from which they are yet fully to emerge.

If a good owner is not the bloke who gives you £1.5bn but might be sanctioned for being, as the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation had it, “involved in … undermining and threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine,” who is it? Not a foreign state looking to improve its image, but also not a hedge fund or plutocrat whose only interest is financial profit.

Which leaves what? A fan-made-good happy to give something back to their community? Some do exist, but their resources are necessarily limited – and the idea the gravel-voiced hauliers and scrap-metal merchants who owned clubs 60 years ago represents some sort of utopia is clearly flawed.

That is the absurdity of modern football. The Premier League is the most popular league in the world; no league has generated so much income. More people watch football in England than ever before. Yet throughout the pyramid clubs are struggling, fans begging for sugar daddies. That is the consequence of the era the Abramovich takeover inaugurated, decoupling a club’s capacity to invest from the revenues it can raise itself.

If we were starting again who would own clubs? It’s easy to talk of fan ownership, 50+1 and golden shares, but could modern fans be trusted not to roll over for the first billionaire to come promising to end what is preposterously described as their suffering, those unconscionable seasons of bobbing along in mid-table? Modern football is often beautiful, but structurally and morally the game is rotten. If we were starting again, it might be a very good thing.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Sat Mar 12, 2022 11:21 pm

Not sure I agree with all of this and there is some some idealistic re-positioning from Chelsea Supporters trust to boot - but there is no doubt that the game needs to rething its ownership model - Miguel Delaney in the Independent

https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/foo ... 33363.html

Roman Abramovich’s Chelsea exit offers rare chance to reimagine club ownership
With so much surrounding the club now uncertain the prospect of a golden share would protect the identity and heritage of Chelsea,

writes Miguel Delaney

1 day ago

As the news of Roman Abramovich’s sanctions properly sank in, many within the Chelsea squad were considering their futures. Some had purely financial and career concerns, but a few wondered how it reflected on them to even be tangentially connected to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Such questions have made elite football a grim enough exercise, but the last two weeks do show how the sport still has the capacity for searing moral lessons. More trivially, it also has the capacity for narratively perfect twists.

Just as the Chelsea situation has provoked a profound examination of football club ownership and the game’s relationship with geopolitics, the club’s very next opponents are Saudi Arabia’s Newcastle United.

“You couldn’t make it up,” one Premier League source said. It does hark back to classic fiction, though. Sunday’s match is the ghosts of football’s past and present against the ghosts of football’s future.

Some of the more politically aware Newcastle fans should at least be conscious that they may soon face similar problems. It is one of many reasons so many people caution against sportswashing and states owning clubs. You are at the mercy of global events way beyond football’s control.

The fluctuations of global oil prices, let alone the politics around the invasion, point to potential ructions. We are talking real “butterfly flapping its wings” possibilities here, as the last two weeks have shown. It does, however, go so much deeper with the owners of Newcastle and Manchester City. The world is already seeing a situation where both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, of whom the Abu Dhabi royal family are the most powerful influence, are positioning themselves more towards Russia and away from the West. It is far from inconceivable that neither of these powers are allies of the United Kingdom or United States in the next five to 10 years, especially as we see a wider move away from oil amid environmental concerns.

It is similarly an indictment of the Premier League that they have done business with Mohammed bin Salman, given he is chairman of the Public Investment Fund that owns Newcastle, but Joe Biden will not. The US president refuses to deal with the crown prince over what the CIA says was his responsibility in the 2018 murder of Jamal Khashoggi, as well as other “despotic acts”.

The effects may not be immediate, but this all has huge potential to ripple out. We are in a changed world. Football is not going untouched.

Some well-connected sources insist the owners of Newcastle, and to a lesser extent City, “should be nervous”. Both are waging a war in Yemen that remains a worse humanitarian disaster than Ukraine, at a time when that Russian invasion is pressuring the game to reassess its relationship with geopolitics.

The Chelsea situation is also precisely why supporters should care about these questions, and where the money comes from. Clubs just shouldn’t be put in this situation where they are fretting about their future due to global politics.

The sad reality is that most won’t care. That can already be seen in the credulous praise for Eddie Howe’s “coaching”, with barely a mention of the £80m spent. That is far more January money than has ever been spent by a club in the bottom half - let alone the bottom three - and wouldn’t have been possible without the takeover. If away fans were allowed to attend Stamford Bridge on Sunday, it would doubtless have seen them essentially celebrating Saudi ownership by singing about how Newcastle are set to take Chelsea’s place.

Many of the home fans are inevitably going to sing Roman Abramovich’s name, even though the sanctions should put a completely different perspective on the ownership of the club. Nobody can just look away anymore or point to the football success or charitable endeavours. The sanctions make it all real. They can’t be obfuscated, denied, or suppressed by legal threats. The government notification outright said Abramovich “has had a close relationship with Putin for decades”. The spokesperson for No 10 later followed with a statement that should be a reality check.

“These measures are obviously designed to punish Putin and ensure any revenue generated cannot make its way through the Russian war machine.”

Any celebration of Abramovich’s name, put bluntly, will be a disgraceful denial of reality. It is set to be a grim scene.

For all the focus on that, though, the real focus should really be on a more influential group of fans - as well as MP Tracey Crouch. In a statement, the Chelsea Supporters Trust said that now is the time “for supporters to be given a golden share as part of a sale of the club”.

Dan Silver, who was one of the voices behind that statement, explains how important that is.

“The golden share protects the Chelsea heritage,” Silver tells The Independent. “The last thing the Chelsea fans want is an MK Dons scenario, where somebody comes in and moves them 100 miles up the road and essentially starts a new football club, it’s why it’s so important.

“It protects the club heritage, there are so many important things iconic to Chelsea, the kit, Stamford Bridge, the name.

“It keeps the key Chelsea heritage points there, so they always play in a blue kit with white socks, will always be Chelsea FC, everything associated with being a Chelsea supporter.”

It is why, far from this being a depressing death for the Chelsea we knew, it should be an exciting opportunity for what club and the English game can be. The Abramovich situation offers a rare chance to reimagine football by ensuring fans have a role in who takes over an elite club as well as how it’s run.

“I think Chelsea could be standard-bearers for football in that respect,” Silver says. “It’s not just about what happens to Chelsea. We don’t want the Burys, or Macclesfields or Derby Counties to go through that.

“It’s why the golden share is such a key point to us.”

This, really, should be front and centre of all the discussions around what next. It should be the driving force. It offers real possibility.

The question is why it hasn’t been brought up yet. Why has it been so absent an issue as the government literally discusses the future of the club with the hierarchy.

Some of that is down to just how diluted and short-sighted the Crouch fan-led review was. It almost completely evaded the issue of owners, and failed to even mention state-owned clubs, even though it was obvious even then this was one of the biggest problems the game had.

That review has now been given “new focus”, in the words of one prominent football source.

It did at least feature core guidance for fans having “golden shares”, and the key question is why the author of the report is not pushing it further. The Independent has been told she has been in touch with supporters, but she hasn’t exactly been publicly visible on an issue that crystallises so many of the points of her report.

“Tracey Crouch has been conspicuously quiet,” one Westminster source told The Independent. “Is she going to speak out about her own fan-led review? Where’s the push? It’s been ignored by government, even as it’s directly relevant to the live story of one of the biggest clubs in the country being on the brink of a forcible sale. We’ve heard nothing from the author of the review that was supposed to hand power back to the fans.”

Other sources have remarked that “it’s astonishing she isn’t on TV all the time saying ‘now is the time’.”

The government evidently needs a prompt to act, and that prompt could come from her. Because now is the time. Football has been handed a rare opportunity.

“What we most want is for there to still be a Chelsea Football Club, to safeguard that future,” Silver says.

That football club need not be a cautionary tale for the game, but a vision of what is possible.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Paul Waine » Sun Mar 13, 2022 12:19 pm

Chester Perry wrote:
Sat Mar 12, 2022 2:07 am
The us a long and dense academic article fro, Simon Chadwick that effectively serves as a condensed overview of all the content I have posted from him on this thread - It argues that there is a an urgent need for a different approach to understanding sport and it's role,

From utilitarianism and neoclassical sport management to a new geopolitical economy of sport
Simon ChadwickORCID Icon
Received 24 May 2021, Accepted 18 Jan 2022, Published online: 11 Feb 2022

ABSTRACT
Research question
In a fast-changing world, this study poses a simple question: is it time to start looking at sport in a different way? Thus far, utilitarian and neoclassical economic thinking has dominated sport management scholarship; however, here it is asked: should scholars now be thinking in terms of a new geopolitical economy of sport?

Conclusions
The world, and more specifically sport, in the twenty-first century, is encountering profound changes, which will shape human existence for at least the next fifty years if not to the end of the century. Global economic and political shifts are challenging the established Western order, power has begun to move beyond centres such as New York and London to Mumbai, Riyadh and Beijing.

With the world thus having changed significantly since the emergence of research and publication in sport management, academia needs to respond with some alacrity. The utilitarian and neoclassical foundations of studies in sport management are not dismissed here as now being outdated; indeed the extensive body of knowledge built over the last four decades will continue to form the basis for researchers and others to understand micro-level phenomena in sport. However, with the advent of a new geopolitical economy of sport, sport management needs to reposition, refocus, rename and move on from its European and North American origins. Sport management – in neoclassical and utilitarian forms – is not dead although a new life is being breathed into our community and its work by a new geopolitical economy of sport.
Of course, I have heavily cut down this quote.

Is this guy serious? Is there really such a thing as the academic research and study of "sport management - beyond the playing of sport?"
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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Sun Mar 13, 2022 1:13 pm

Paul Waine wrote:
Sun Mar 13, 2022 12:19 pm
Of course, I have heavily cut down this quote.

Is this guy serious? Is there really such a thing as the academic research and study of "sport management - beyond the playing of sport?"
Several thousand University professors who specialise in one aspect or another in that broad subject matter and tens of thousands of students - just look at the scale of Brendan Floods University of Club Football Business and associated educational ventures, which specialises in the area (and has several competitors) in Europe.

There is no doubt that Chadwick is a specialist and has carved out his own academic niche, of which he is the global leader and which has rapidly become splintered into sub niches- a research area in academia does this out of necessity once there are 50 to 100 researchers on a topic.
and if you are still in doubt just do a quick search of the sports business journals out there both generalised and sport specific then add in the the associations for the business professionals is really is quite colossal

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Sun Mar 13, 2022 8:12 pm

Another article - this time an Opinion Column in today's Observer from author David Goldblatt

Abramovich is but one in a long list of tainted owners. Is there no end to sportswashing?
David Goldblatt

Football continues to offer so many ways to embellish the ugliest political realities

Sun 13 Mar 2022 08.00 GMT

Roman Abramovich is not unusual. This is worth emphasising. Rich as he may be, and as politically connected as befits an ex-governor of a Russian province, Abramovich’s 18 years as owner of Chelsea is just the best known example of the ways in which economic power and political actors have come to shape and dominate global football.

Consider, beyond Abramovich, how Vladimir Putin’s regime has used the game. Russia’s leading clubs have been allocated to allied oligarchs, state companies and local warlords, such as Chechnya’s president, Ramzan Kadyrov. Football ultras have been recruited as muscle for ersatz youth movements and intimidating political opponents. Other pliant, unsanctioned oligarchs who still own foreign clubs include Dmitry Rybolovlev at Monaco and Club Brugge and Ivan Savvidis, president of Thessaloniki’s PAOK.

State-owned Gazprom has sponsored Fifa and Uefa, as well as Chelsea, Schalke 04 and Red Star Belgrade, three clubs in politically important markets for the company. And, the jewel in the crown, Russia won the hosting rights to the 2018 World Cup and put on a sporting Potemkin village that obscured both domestic protest over its disastrous pension reforms, and its own international malevolence.

Russia is not alone in this. In the past 20 years, football, never short of political suitors, has in much of the world been colonised by political power and projects. Why have the world’s states, politicians and political movements shown such an unprecedented interest in the game?

Money is a factor for some. Consider the former Honduran president Rafael Callejas, who attempted to financially secure his retirement by becoming the president of the Honduran Football Association, an institution even more corrupt and opaque than the office of head of state, by taking huge bribes from broadcasters.

Football is also the perfect place to launder yet more money. Russian organised criminals bought small Portuguese clubs for precisely this purpose, while Colombian and Mexican football remain awash with drug money.

The perceptible rise in politicians’ engagement with the game has increasingly made football an object of state intervention

Football, however, offers many things more alluring than mere graft or money-changing options. At a minimum, association with the game delivers profile and local popularity. More substantially, it offers established popular arenas for playing political theatre, ready-made and ritualised local identities to piggyback upon, and a source of malleable narratives to garnish political progress. Correctly used, it can do so not just for local or national politicians, but for nation states on the global stage.

Consequently, many politicians have systematically incorporated football fandom into their carefully constructed public personas and football metaphors into their language, like presidents Lula, Ahmadinejad, Mugabe and Erdoğan. Silvio Berlusconi and Mauricio Macri began their political ascents as presidents of AC Milan and Boca Juniors respectively. Others have actually played the game professionally while in power, like Bolivia’s Evo Morales or Hungary’s Viktor Orbán.

The perceptible rise in politicians’ engagement with the game has not been merely tub-thumping nationalism or an exercise in personal grandstanding – though there has been plenty of both of those – but has increasingly made football an object of state intervention.

Taking a leaf out of Putin’s book, the Aliyevs, the post-Soviet ruling dynasty in Azerbaijan, have sought to counter international opprobrium for their dismal human rights record with pharaonic stadium projects, hosting games at last year’s European football championships and the 2019 Europa League final and using the state oil company to sponsor Uefa and Atlético Madrid.

In Hungary and Turkey, publicly funded, multibillion-pound programmes of stadium redevelopment have been used by Orbán and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to help nurture a new class of allied construction and real-estate oligarchs, and both have acquired, in effect, their own football clubs, Puskás Akadémia and Istanbul Başakşehir.

Latin America is wearisomely familiar with the political uses of football and the 21st century has seen a short-lived Chavista takeover of Venezuelan football and a bitter 10-year battle between left and right over the nationalisation and then privatisation of domestic football’s television rights.

However, the real ambition is in Asia, where even the small teams can dream. After deciding against using public money to buy Manchester United, Myanmar’s junta ordered the country’s richest men to create and fund a Myanmar premier league. In China, where Xi Jinping’s “three wishes” – qualifying for, hosting and winning the men’s World Cup – have become official national priorities, a gigantic school football programme has been initiated to make it happen.

Our leagues persist with ‘a fit and proper person’s test’ designed to exclude small-time fraudsters, not global powers

The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, who each own a major European football club, are spending heavily on football sponsorships and carry considerable influence at Fifa, Uefa and in Asian football too. In Qatar, the game is the single most important instrument in the state’s programme of economic and urban development and the most powerful plank in its foreign policy of visibility.

What appears so remarkable about this is that, like Abramovich’s arrival at Chelsea, it has, for the most part, been waved through, even welcomed, nowhere more obviously than the Premier League’s acceptance of Saudi state ownership at Newcastle United while the brutal war in Yemen continues to rage.

The world’s football federations and leagues have blithely accepted all of this, despite continuing to mouth the “sport and politics don’t mix” pieties of the 19th century. Even where they do have to face the political realties of our age, they are equipped with neither the legitimacy nor the legal or political instatement to do much about it – our own leagues, for example, persist with “a fit and proper person’s test” designed to exclude small-time fraudsters, not global powers.

None of this would matter very much if football had not become the singularly most important space in global popular culture. None of this would matter if sportswashing did not work, and football did not buy influence, but they do, as demonstrated so accurately by the Chelsea fans who chanted Abramovich’s name while others showed solidarity with Ukraine’s plight.

So what is to be done? We could start with a shift to the social ownership of all football clubs. We could insist on the strictest financial and legal regulations of football institutions. We could demand real transparency and accountability from national and international football federations, the empowerment of players and supporters and their deeper democratisation. Politics is not leaving football in the near future. The question is: what kind of politics do we want?

David Goldblatt is the author of The Ball Is Round: A Global History of Football and The Game of Our Lives
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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Hipper » Mon Mar 14, 2022 9:47 am

Chester Perry wrote:
Sat Mar 12, 2022 7:43 pm
Jonathan Wilson in the Guardian asks one of the most pertinent question in football right now - some hope it is one the proposed new football regulator will answer

Roman Abramovich and Chelsea symbolise the rotten state of football
The Premier League is often a beautiful spectacle, but its thirst for success and wealth at all costs has tainted its spirit
The Premier League was founded on the very principles that Wilson claims has tainted its spirit.

It's The Premier League itself - the idea of it - that is tainted.

However it is only an extension of the sport's history.

When football started as an amateur sport, some clubs started to bring in players from outside their locality. In order to do this the owners would get them jobs in local industry. They also started paying them - professional footballers had arrived. Cup competitions and friendlies were not enough to provide regular income to pay these players so the Football League was formed in 1888 leading to more predictable finances. The clubs were mostly play things of local businessmen. Like society though especially from the 1960s onwards, the rich got richer and were determined to change the odds in their favour. Abolition of the maximum wage and gate money going to the home side (previously it was shared) all increased the success and wealth of the richer clubs at the expense of the poor. There was a trickle down effect in the Football League but as in the real world it didn't help much. Inequality increased. The formation of The Premier League by the self appointed 'Big Five' at that time, in order to grab as much of the new source of finance, TV broadcast money, further exacerbated things. Money attracts more money and in come all these crooks.

Looked at like this, the formation of the European Super League was just a natural progression. Perhaps the rebellion against it, and now the repercussions of the Ukraine war, will lead to a fairer football set up. I doubt it though, just as it probably won't change the society it has come from.
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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by ClaretPete001 » Mon Mar 14, 2022 10:19 am

Football is just a manifestation of the failings of free market capitalism. In an ideal world competition would remain stable and any business sector would be in a constant state of re-envisioning with new players emerging. But we know that does not happen because the early entrants use their success to create barriers to entry and drive out the competition.

The big 6 in the Premiership are behaving just like any big business in any sector - they want to increase their share price and do not want competition.

The Glazers and the Kroenke's are happy to come third in the Premiership as long as they are increasing their global brand and growing the share price.

The problem for the likes of Arsenal in particular is that if they get too mediocre it starts to affect the brand

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Paul Waine » Mon Mar 14, 2022 12:38 pm

Chester Perry wrote:
Sun Mar 13, 2022 1:13 pm
Several thousand University professors who specialise in one aspect or another in that broad subject matter and tens of thousands of students - just look at the scale of Brendan Floods University of Club Football Business and associated educational ventures, which specialises in the area (and has several competitors) in Europe.

There is no doubt that Chadwick is a specialist and has carved out his own academic niche, of which he is the global leader and which has rapidly become splintered into sub niches- a research area in academia does this out of necessity once there are 50 to 100 researchers on a topic.
and if you are still in doubt just do a quick search of the sports business journals out there both generalised and sport specific then add in the the associations for the business professionals is really is quite colossal
Hi CP, I hope you are wrong when you say "several thousand university professors..." if their studies are leading them into the areas that Chadwick suggests had got anything to do with "sports management." Yes, by all means, let students study the "business of sport" in its broadest sense. But, most of Chadwick's research proposal has got nothing to do with sport except as "sport" as an instrument of political power.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Mon Mar 14, 2022 12:44 pm

Paul Waine wrote:
Mon Mar 14, 2022 12:38 pm
Hi CP, I hope you are wrong when you say "several thousand university professors..." if their studies are leading them into the areas that Chadwick suggests had got anything to do with "sports management." Yes, by all means, let students study the "business of sport" in its broadest sense. But, most of Chadwick's research proposal has got nothing to do with sport except as "sport" as an instrument of political power.
not several thousand in the narrow field of Chadwick, no

Several thousand in the general field of sports management and the specialisms that fall from it, yes

Chadwick's specialism is the Geo Political Sports Economy - which Venns over a huge range of subject matter from Politics, Business Studies (Sports Management tends to be a Business School subject), Sociology, Economics and beyond.

It is more about understanding how the world of Academia works

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Paul Waine » Mon Mar 14, 2022 12:50 pm

ClaretPete001 wrote:
Mon Mar 14, 2022 10:19 am
Football is just a manifestation of the failings of free market capitalism. In an ideal world competition would remain stable and any business sector would be in a constant state of re-envisioning with new players emerging. But we know that does not happen because the early entrants use their success to create barriers to entry and drive out the competition.

The big 6 in the Premiership are behaving just like any big business in any sector - they want to increase their share price and do not want competition.

The Glazers and the Kroenke's are happy to come third in the Premiership as long as they are increasing their global brand and growing the share price.

The problem for the likes of Arsenal in particular is that if they get too mediocre it starts to affect the brand
Hi Pete, "free market capitalism" is all about "competition" including the control (and elimination) of monopolistic behaviours. Yes, the successful get wealthier. Free market capitalism would ensure that opportunities didn't just accrue to those with the greatest wealth and that there were opportunities for clubs lower down in the football pyramid. In a perfect world clubs that fail would "go bust" and be removed from the pyramid. There would be no talk of measures to preserve a club such as Chelsea who's owner has a relationship with a country that has invaded another country.

Think how "competition" would be if we didn't strive for a "free market" model?

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by ClaretPete001 » Mon Mar 14, 2022 1:08 pm

I would guess like any social science Sports management has its fair share of Foucauldian type critical theorists who interpret social behaviour through the lens of power.

To be fair sport is a favourite pastime of dictators and brand washers. Where would Lazio be without Mussolini or who would have heard of Jesse Owens without Hitler?

Course I forgot to mention the other brand of neo liberal capitalism that manifestly doesn't do what it says on the tin, which is American capitalism whereby the rich use other people's money to make more money and the risk/reward justification for excessive corporate pay becomes meaningless.

It's ironic that the very thing that neo-liberal capitalism purports to offer is competition and the fact that it doesn't at all is the very thing that threatens truly competitive sports.

What we need is not neo-liberalism but a form neo-capitalism that re-defines ownership models of business.

Otherwise the West is going to die on the back of supply side economics, low productivity and cheap labour.

Don't panic Paul - ALK will be long gone before that happens.....!

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by GodIsADeeJay81 » Mon Mar 14, 2022 3:38 pm

Barcelona handed huge blow in bid to sign Erling Haaland https://mol.im/a/10611125 via https://dailym.ai/android

I see Barca face having to deal with further restrictions on their spending this summer.
Amazing how here in England we're constantly told it isn't enforceable, to cap wages etc, yet they seem to just get on with it in Spain.
This user liked this post: ClaretPete001

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Paul Waine » Mon Mar 14, 2022 6:28 pm

Chester Perry wrote:
Mon Mar 14, 2022 12:44 pm
not several thousand in the narrow field of Chadwick, no

Several thousand in the general field of sports management and the specialisms that fall from it, yes

Chadwick's specialism is the Geo Political Sports Economy - which Venns over a huge range of subject matter from Politics, Business Studies (Sports Management tends to be a Business School subject), Sociology, Economics and beyond.

It is more about understanding how the world of Academia works
Sounds like Chadwick would have found a discussion about how many angels on the head of a needle right up his street.

Most academics I know are a lot closer to the "real world."

Each to their own, I guess.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Mon Mar 14, 2022 6:30 pm

Paul Waine wrote:
Mon Mar 14, 2022 6:28 pm
Sounds like Chadwick would have found a discussion about how many angels on the head of a needle right up his street.

Most academics I know are a lot closer to the "real world."

Each to their own, I guess.
he is very close to the real world - he is a lifelong Middlesbrough Fan

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Paul Waine » Mon Mar 14, 2022 6:33 pm

Chester Perry wrote:
Mon Mar 14, 2022 6:30 pm
he is very close to the real world - he is a lifelong Middlesbrough Fan
That "research" paper is so far from the real world, in my opinion, that I'd worry about air pollution from all the Teesside chemical plants. ;)

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by randomclaret2 » Mon Mar 14, 2022 6:56 pm

Football was so much better before the " academics " started getting interested.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by ClaretPete001 » Mon Mar 14, 2022 8:00 pm

Chester Perry wrote:
Mon Mar 14, 2022 6:30 pm
he is very close to the real world - he is a lifelong Middlesbrough Fan
We are currently in the middle of a geo-political war, which has meant a change of ownership at a football club and a show of solidarity from all clubs. In the meantime we have 17 Premiership clubs that are owned by billionaires with global networks of business interests.

We also have a consortium of clubs who feel that the richest league in the world is not big enough for them and want to create a European super league and no doubt eventually a world super league.

Our own club is now owned by Americans touting Artificial Intelligence as a complimentary product to on field activities. No doubt the club has state of the art analytics to analyse every aspect of its employees performance and well-being.

Middlesbrough Football Club is probably the least Middlesbrough thing about Middlesbrough outside of the Uni.

Anything less now than Chadwick would put power looms in fear of a good beating....!

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Mon Mar 14, 2022 8:46 pm

The BBC are catching up with everyone else

Chelsea & Roman Abramovich: Is this a moment of reckoning for English football ownership?
By Dan Roan
BBC sports editor
Last updated on6 hours ago6 hours ago.

The sanctioning of Chelsea owner Roman Abramovich in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine has, perhaps like never before, forced English football to confront questions over who exactly should be allowed to own its top clubs.

With the risk of letting clubs becoming embroiled in geopolitics now exposed, football authorities and the government will face questions in parliament on the issue on Tuesday.

So what should and can be done? Why has it taken until now? Is it too late? And what damage has been done?

'The sportwashing derby' and difficult days for football
These are certainly chastening days for the sport. Sunday's match between imperilled Chelsea and Saudi Arabian-bankrolled Newcastle United was dubbed in places as 'the sportswashing derby'. It was portrayed by some critics as one of the darkest episodes in the history of the Premier League.

With the Club World champions in turmoil, sponsors deserting the club, and fears of financial ruin amid a block on merchandising and ticket sales, Chelsea's fans now face opprobrium because a section of their support continue to sing the name of the man whose fortune brought them almost two decades of glory.

This singing was despite the government describing Abramovich as "a pro-Kremlin oligarch" who has had a "close relationship" with Vladimir Putin for decades, and obtained "financial benefit" and "preferential treatment" from that relationship.

One of the companies Abramovich co-owns, the government claims, may even have made steel for Russian tanks. That has been denied by the firm and Abramovich - who has always rejected suggestions of links with the Russian President.

But given the horrors Putin has unleashed on Ukraine, many are appalled that so many Chelsea fans remain loyal to the oligarch, and concerned at what that reveals about football's priorities and values.

As if the sight of a pro-Abramovich banner at Stamford Bridge was not uncomfortable enough for the game, the manager of Newcastle United then found himself (again) facing questions over Saudi Arabia's human rights record at his post-match press conference.

Howe insisted he would "stick to football" and many Newcastle fans seem to think such questions are unfair. Certainly it would be better if a representative of the club's majority owners PIF was available to be asked such questions. Similarly, there would have perhaps been more transparency and accountability at Chelsea if Abramovich had granted the occasional interview over the years where he could have faced questions over his motives for owning the club.

Many feel such questions to Howe are both inevitable and entirely legitimate when - despite the club's insistence of separation between the club's majority owner sovereign wealth fund PIF that controls the club and the Saudi state - PIF is chaired by the country's ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman himself.

Or when - just as Chelsea executives have asked manager Thomas Tuchel to field questions about the sanctioning of the owner - no-one from PIF gives an interview or press conference themselves. Or when a Saudi flag was spotted among Newcastle fans at Stamford Bridge. And when Saudi Arabia is itself engaged in a war - in Yemen, in which, according to Human Rights Watch "all parties… have committed serious violations of the laws of war, many of which may amount to war crimes…"

Many Newcastle fans in turn point to the £11bn of annual trade the UK does with Saudi Arabia - including being one of the world's largest sellers of arms to the kingdom - and ask why football should be held to a higher standard.

They ask why investment into a club such as theirs should be blocked when the government is happy to do business with Saudi Arabia in other industries. Indeed, this week the Prime Minister himself is reportedly poised to visit Riyadh for talks on oil.

Chelsea fans can point to the way Russian finance was warmly welcomed into London over the last two decades, and ask why they should be singled out.

As Liverpool manager Jurgen Klopp asked last week: "Did anyone really care when Roman Abramovich came to Chelsea? Did anyone really care when Newcastle got taken over? Do supporters really care?"

Klopp did say football needs to "think more about where the money is coming from", adding: "It is pretty obvious where the money is coming from. Everyone knew it, but we accepted it. That's our fault. It is society's fault so we accepted it. Now we cannot accept it anymore and so we punish them. It is not Chelsea's fault. Not at all."

'We all have to start waking up - it is a point in our history'
Others of course insist none of this makes it right, and that football clubs - as vital cultural and community assets - should be afforded greater protection than other businesses. And also that, because of the global profile and prestige they offer owners, there now needs to be much greater recognition of the risk that they are exploited for 'sportswashing' purposes.

"We've got to think now about how we protect our assets," says Simon Chadwick, global professor of sport at the Emlyon Business School in Paris.

"As a country we need to engage in a much more informed debate about what we want from football, to set aside personal interests and rivalries and decide as a community what we like."

Chadwick accepts football club ownership simply reflects the country's willingness over decades to open itself up to investors from across the world as a means of maintaining status, wealth and power.

But he also believes English football has been slow to address unstoppable forces connected to globalisation, digitalisation and the environment, with countries in the East trying to use energy revenues as the basis for diversifying their economies and extending their political influence across the world.

"This is a point in our history," he warns. "We all have to start waking up because what we all realise is that football has become deeply embedded within a geopolitical network that is very hard to extricate oneself from.

"What it's done is to raise awareness that we're exposed and vulnerable to the advances of other countries."

It is not just Chelsea, of course, who have been exposed by Russia's invasion.

Everton have suspended their commercial sponsorship arrangements with Russian companies part-owned by oligarch Alisher Usmanov after he had his assets frozen by the European Union because they say he is "a pro-Kremlin oligarch with particularly close ties" to Putin. Usmanov has denied this and vowed a legal challenge.

Manchester United have had to drop their sponsorship deal with airline Aeroflot. Uefa has had to do the same with state-controlled energy giant Gazprom.

Fifa meanwhile faces renewed accusations it may have helped embolden Putin when, despite the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Russian president was able to use the 2018 World Cup to project a positive image of his country to the world.

The sense of overdue reckoning that English football is now experiencing will intensify this week when senior executives from both the FA and Premier League - along with the Sports Minister - are questioned by MPs on the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport committee about the role of Russian money in both the ownership and sponsorship of clubs.

But as Newcastle United have discovered, the conflict in Ukraine will force questions about the motivation of investors from other countries too, as well as a focus on the source of funds.

Since the UAE joined China and India by refusing to back a US resolution at the UN Security Council condemning Russia's invasion, there has been renewed scrutiny on Manchester City's Abu Dhabi owners.

City are of course majority owned by the investment group of Sheikh Mansour, a member of the Abu Dhabi ruling family and deputy prime minister of the UAE.

Will Pep Guardiola - like Howe - now be asked to comment on the UAE's role in the Saudi-led military operation in Yemen? Or the country's human rights record?

Asked last week for his thoughts on Chelsea, Guardiola said he would wait to be more informed before giving his opinion: "We are the face of the club, we are here every few days. You have to understand there are subjects we don't know and don't have an hour lesson to speak and talk about.

"It looks like we have to know absolutely everything. We are human beings - I don't know."

City, like Newcastle and Chelsea, reject any suggestion of 'sportswashing' of course.

City, for instance, can point to the profit they made in their most recent accounts, and insist they are now a sustainable organisation, with Abu Dhabi's investment helping to regenerate the east of Manchester. They point out that the club has Chinese and American investors as well as the controlling stake from the UAE.

Similarly, Newcastle United have vowed to invest in the wider north-east of England region.

But it feels significant that the DCMS committee has warned on Tuesday it will also ask "if the government is concerned about investments in UK sport from other nations with poor human rights records such as China and Saudi Arabia".

What could happen next?
The Sports Minister Nigel Huddlestone is bound to be asked where the government is up to with its response to the fan-led review his predecessor Tracey Crouch published last year in the wake of the proposed Super League and a series of clubs falling into financial difficulties.

He is also likely to be asked whether the events of recent weeks have made it more likely the government will accept in full Crouch's recommendation for an independent football regulator with the power to rule on a beefed-up Owners and Directors Test - which the former minister believes would have "stress-tested" the Saudi takeover more than at present.

Huddlestone could also be asked how the government feels about football being used to improve a country's image and if it is prepared to consider making a special case of clubs, barring potential owners with direct links to states, governments and rulers, and risk sacrificing the investment and jobs that have accompanied such acquisitions?

And indeed whether the model that will now be applied to Chelsea - with the government effectively needing to approve the new owner - should now be used for all future takeovers? The benefit of greater fan ownership could also be discussed.

Premier League policy chief Helen MacNamara, who is also appearing in front of MPs, will no doubt be asked if the clubs who so fiercely opposed Crouch's idea of an independent regulator have now grudgingly accepted something needs to change.

That could include a human rights component being incorporated into its owners and directors test, as demanded by Amnesty, as the league conducts its own review of its regulations - and whether owners should be mandated to engage with the media and fans in the interests of accountability and transparency.

Football - when challenged over its sustainability and governance - has proved resistant to change and outside interference. Even after the Super League controversy, the FA pushed back against an independent regulator, its chair Debbie Hewitt insisting it could be trusted to take on the role.

But there now seems to be renewed momentum behind those who believe Chelsea's predicament - and the unedifying mood surrounding Sunday's match, set against the appalling suffering in Ukraine - is a warning that must be heeded by the game, and that this time, something has to change.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Tue Mar 15, 2022 12:14 pm

Interesting discussion and changes in attitudes on Sky's Monday Night Football last night - all related to my recent postings on
this thread

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7D1FUaQen3U

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Tue Mar 15, 2022 12:29 pm

At the end of that clip in the last post we saw reference to a Saudi bid for Chelsea and suggestion that the government will not be able to allow it - Martin Samuel in the Mail yesterday showed why that is a more complex issue than most think - you have to see though the high dramatics to get there including reference to a particularly pulic unsavoury outburst from Bob Lord that should never be forgotten by Burnley fans, but it is quite clearly explained

MARTIN SAMUEL: Roman Abramovich's downfall has already shone an unwelcome light on the ownership at Newcastle... if Saudis of greater toxicity have been welcomed through the door at St James' Park, how can the Saudi Media Group be kicked out of Chelsea?
  • The government has found bother attempting to run Chelsea over recent days
  • Sanctioning Roman Abramovich is easy, but steering the club is the hard part
  • There is a huge decision to be made if the interest from Saudi Arabia is genuine
  • If it is let through, the government will be the one that sold football out to Saudis
  • But block the deal and they may have rejected the best offer for no good reason
By MARTIN SAMUEL - SPORT FOR THE DAILY MAIL

PUBLISHED: 22:33, 14 March 2022 | UPDATED: 22:33, 14 March 2022

There are some people who think the Government couldn’t run a whelk stall; it’s certainly found bother trying to run a football club.

Sanctioning Roman Abramovich is easy. Steering Chelsea FC the hard part. If the interest of the Saudi Media Group is genuine at £2.7billion, there is also now be a huge decision to make.

Let it through and this will be the Government that sold football out to Saudi Arabia, just at a time when politicians were pontificating about fans taking back control. Block the deal and they may well have rejected the best offer, for no good reason, considering Saudi owners of considerably greater toxicity have already been welcomed through the door at Newcastle.

Add to this that Boris Johnson needs the Saudis close if he is not to preside over another petrol crisis, or that making the Saudis feel like pariahs could be diplomatically disastrous in an unstable economic climate, and the unintended consequences of sanctioning one man and his football club could turn extraordinarily serious in the coming days.

Say the SMG are genuine bidders for Chelsea. The Raine Group may decide they are the best option, meaning the deal passes to the Government for permission.

Abramovich’s ownership of Chelsea has already shone an unwelcome light on the Saudis at Newcastle, where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman appears simultaneously to be overseeing the restructure of a defence and the levelling of parts of Yemen. Comparisons have been drawn between wars fought in Europe, and those in the Middle East.

Yet the Saudis are our friends. Meaning theirs is an acceptable war. Indeed, much cordial back-channelling helped smooth through the deal at Newcastle. So how could that transaction be permitted, even encouraged, and not this one, with a private company that does not have direct Government links?

Alternately, how could Johnson claim to be Saudi Arabia’s friend, if he treats their money as if it is dirty? Chelsea’s fans certainly won’t be happy if the Government presses for an inferior deal with American venture capitalists. Even one of their own, the property developer and season-ticket holder Nick Candy, might come second to the Saudi money with some.

There is less romanticism about ownership these days. They love Steve Gibson at Middlesbrough but, generally, the modern game has created a generation of pragmatist supporters. They want someone who can take the club forward, who can spend, who can compete. Jack Walker was great for Blackburn, but the local lad made good now needs to be a billionaire, too.

Equally, fans want a say, a veto over the important stuff, maybe the famed golden share. But they still desire some very rich investor to buy Erling Haaland and give Antonio Rudiger whatever he asks. Arsenal fans want Stan Kroenke out, but the guy they want in owns Spotify, not two together in the North Bank.

Chelsea could have been reinvented as a model of fan ownership, the 50+1 German ideal. Nobody has called for that because elite clubs seek billionaires to bear the financial responsibility.

It is a rather delicious irony that the man who did most to empower supporters in English football, was also the owner who wanted to put a few dozen volts through them if they tried to get on to his pitch. That was Ken Bates, in 1985.

After a series of crowd incidents at Chelsea, and elsewhere, he proposed an 11ft perimeter fence, with barbed wire and, above that, a 12-volt current. His plan was rejected by the Greater London Council’s Public Services Committee, and widely condemned.

Yet it was also Bates who, in 1997, came up with the idea of the Chelsea Pitch Owners, turning over the Stamford Bridge ground and the name, Chelsea FC, to the fans. He did this to keep the club, and its lucrative location, from the grasp of property developers, Cabra and Marler Estates.

There are currently roughly 15,000 CPO shares, with voting rights capped at 100 to ensure no individual has control. The fans still own Chelsea FC’s name with one condition: the club plays at Stamford Bridge.

This battle raged throughout what we are led to believe was the golden age of club ownership. The innocent bygone time before Russians and Arabs came in with their filthy petro-wealth and besmirched our pure competition.

Other highlights of the golden age? How about the Variety Club of Great Britain dinner in March 1974 when Bob Lord, guest of honour and chairman of Burnley, expanded on his objection to televised football. ‘We have to stand up against a move to get soccer on the cheap by the Jews who run TV,’ said Lord. There remains a stand named in his honour at Turf Moor.

Also no fan of television, Louis Edwards, chairman of Manchester United. A World In Action expose broadcast on January 28, 1980, alleged illegal share deals, false documentation, secret payments to council and company staff to win contracts, and secret payments by Manchester United from a special fund for player recruitment.

On February 12, Greater Manchester Police announced an investigation, on February 25, Edwards died of a heart attack.

And before the fit and proper persons’ test, which is now going to be significantly tightened up, there was a code of conduct for football club directors.

And why was it needed? A tabloid tale involving two Newcastle board members, Freddy Shepherd and Douglas Hall, who resigned in 1998. The pair were quoted calling Newcastle women ‘dogs’, mocking players, including Alan Shearer, and boasting that they indulged in sex and drinking sessions around the world. It was a golden age.

So, yes, the crisis at Chelsea is an apposite moment for football to consider its ownership models, but it has always required significant money to run a big, successful club. And significant money is not always the purest.

Going back to the 19th century, the major clubs in the north were often linked to mills and, no doubt, profits made in archetypal Victorian working conditions.

Sir Henry Norris, largely credited with Arsenal’s ascent to the top division, was banned for life from football in 1929 for, among other offences, offering under-the-counter payments to Charlie Buchan. And, no, it’s not the same as a limited war in Europe.

Yet Chelsea were not directly allied to that either until three weeks ago. At least give football’s authorities time to digest this development before popping up with your next hot take on cleaning up its act.

That was hardly the popular view when Chelsea won the Champions League, as recently as last May. Certainly, it wasn’t a concern for Michael Gove — currently campaigning to hand the mansions of oligarchs to Ukrainian refugees — who attended the game as a Chelsea fan.

Equally, while the golden age of club ownership is something of a myth, so too is the idea that the world is full of wholesome local billionaires just aching to buy a football club. Why have the Saudis got Newcastle? Mainly, because in the decade or so it was effectively on the market under Mike Ashley, not a single British businessman, let alone one from the North East, wanted to purchase it at the going rate.

Sir John Hall sold to Ashley in the first place because he didn’t want to surrender his fortune challenging Abramovich. ‘I was not prepared to throw unlimited money at it to compete with him,’ he confirmed last year.

It now takes a certain type of owner to sit among football’s elite, so there will often be complications because billionaire investors have wide-ranging portfolios. In the days when a butcher could run a football club — both Lord and Edwards were butchers, although not small ones — the money came from one source.

Yet Daniel Kretinsky, who has just invested in West Ham, has a portfolio that includes 49 per cent of Eustream, a Slovakian pipeline that carries Russian gas to Europe. So he’s a bad guy? Not really. He also owns a large share of Foot Locker, the French newspaper Le Monde, the Royal Mail and Sainsbury’s.

It’s a typically diverse portfolio. All of the buyers circling Chelsea have one. Abramovich certainly did. He had interests in banking, insurance, aluminium, oil, property, electricity, pulp and paper processing, airlines, automobile manufacture, steel, gas —and, of course, football.

Each of Chelsea’s suitors will be similarly diverse; and, chances are, there may be one strand that leads offshore to Panama or a mine somewhere with a poor safety record, because that’s the world of global business, and pretty much always has been.

This is why it’s harsh to judge football supporters who grade owners on the football alone.

A Newcastle fan will have bought his ticket through many generations of stewardship — the McKeag family, Hall and Shepherd, Ashley, the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia. Is that same fan now to pass moral judgment on Hall’s contributions to the Conservative Party, Shepherd’s conduct on foreign trips, the working conditions in Ashley’s warehouses, human rights in Saudi Arabia or the civil war in Yemen?

All or any of these decisions, controversies or outrages, could be a reason not to attend. Yet all that fan wants to do is watch his, or her, club. Why should fans make the moral reckonings governments do not? Governments do business, they accept donations — whether from Hall, or Russia, with love.

Boris Johnson may travel to Saudi this very week. Will he be discussing Yemen, or last week’s 81 beheadings? No, he’ll be asking them to keep oil prices down, because of developments in Russia. It’s only Eddie Howe, the Newcastle manager, who gets asked to comment on crime and punishment in Saudi. And maybe Thomas Tuchel soon, if new owners get their hands on Chelsea.

By all means have a discussion about club ownership and due process, but do not forget where this starts and stops. At the top, with who we court as our allies and business partners, not at the bottom with the powerless chanting Abramovich’s name because they mistakenly think that shows solidarity with their club in difficult times.

They do not need pompous lectures from the press box, or from the Prime Minister’s office, particularly given what a mess has been made of the position to here.

Far from advancing the cause of a Government regulator for football, the situation at Chelsea has proven why politicians and their cronies should not come within a mile of it. They haven’t a clue. Their numbers are wrong, their preparations were insufficient, their foresight is zero, their organisational skills are non-existent.

And these are the people we want to steer the national game? We’re lucky Matt Hancock hasn’t handed the keys to Stamford Bridge to a bloke he knows from the pub.

This is the party of business, apparently, yet it cannot even devise a mechanism enabling Chelsea to sell tickets beyond the match with Brentford on April 2. West Ham are due to visit on April 23 but there will be no away end and less than capacity for home supporters because no money can reach Abramovich.

And how was it supposed to do that? Just set up a fund, for all new ticket receipts, catering, all matchday revenue and keep it for when the new owners arrive. How hard can that be?

How hard can it have been to properly calculate the running costs for away trips and to adequately cater for matches, yet the Government’s figures were hugely off.

They had weeks to plan, weeks to consult, to ask the right people, to ensure a great club wasn’t plunged into financial crisis — and they failed. And these are the people to choose a regulatory body?

The sanctions at Chelsea have tested the Government’s sincerity on football. They could have set up a mechanism to transfer the club to the Chelsea Pitch Owners, they could have given them 51 per cent.

They did neither. The Government looked at an elite football club and, for all its fine rhetoric and fan-led reviews, immediately recognised the new owner had to have a portfolio worth billions, not a square-foot parcel of land sold for a pittance as a smart tactic in a previous century.

What was not expected was incoming from Saudi Arabia. Not as easy as it looks, the business of football. It never was just a game.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Fri Mar 18, 2022 7:31 pm

The latest blog from the chaps at Vysyble reminds those who forget the size of the change that Roman Abramovich brought to the game

https://vysyble.com/blog-017t

I will follow it with today's offering from Miguel Delay in the Independent who looks at the prospect of choices the Premier League and football is facing in the choosing of a new owner for Chelsea and it offers a chance for a new outlook - not hat their is much chance of that choice being taken

https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/foo ... 38728.html

Will the Chelsea takeover be a watershed moment for the Premier League?
For all the talk of review and reform to clean up dirty money funding the Premier League, there is little to indicate drastic change is coming


Miguel Delaney Chief Football Writer 4 hours ago

Mere hours before Friday’s 9pm deadline to bid for Chelsea, the consortium led by Todd Boehly were confident. There is an optimism they have the best all-round offer, right up to fan involvement.

Other well-placed sources urge more caution, and say to look away from where the noise is coming from. They insist some of the more interested parties have not yet come to light, because they do not feel the need to play this out in public. “There’s more posturing than reality – on all sides.” What was true was that, as of Friday morning, the number of parties at any kind of advanced stage was no more than three.

Chelsea news LIVE: Sale deadline nears as takeover bids due and Champions League quarter-final draw
Friday will reveal who is serious. The same sources insist there is substance to interest from the Saudi Research and Media Group. Much could depend on the internal politics of Saudi Arabia, and whether crown prince Mohamed Bin Salman would want two clubs under the influence of his state. Sources close to the Public Investment Fund (PIF) – who own Newcastle United – are dubious it will happen.

If it were successful, however, that would leave open the possibility that the ultimate ruler of Saudi Arabia essentially has influence over 10 per cent of the Premier League. That, according to various figures in football and close to Saudi Arabian business, “would totally undermine the integrity of the Premier League”.

The Raine Group, mandated to handle the sale on behalf of Chelsea, will make the main decision on the bidders. Much will depend on the factors influencing the decision, but keeping the club at the top level is known to be one. The UK government is involved in awarding the new licence that allows the sale, and ensuring that any money does not go to Roman Abramovich.

After that, the Premier League Owners and Directors Test will decide whether the successful bidders are suitable.

The process will tell us if football has actually learned much over the last few weeks, and whether we are moving into a new era, where the game is more alert to how it has been hijacked by far higher powers.

This entire Chelsea story has articulated a number of core issues for the governance of the sport. There is the unquestioning embrace of any money, the protection of clubs, the slowness of regulation and – most of all – just how precariously subject football is to forces way beyond its control. This is the geopolitical position the game has got itself into.

The forced departure of Abramovich exploded the aloof fantasy the Premier League could forever go untouched by real-world concerns.

The tide is coming out, to paraphrase Warren Buffett, and it’s only now we’re discovering who’s been swimming with emperor’s – or perhaps state – clothes. Where once the Premier League saw international investment at so many clubs as piles of cash, it now looks like a lot of potential problems and financial holes. Gary Neville went on the country’s flagship live football programme on Sky Sports and pointed at the various clubs touched by this, referencing Chinese investment at Wolves and saying that Manchester City may have a problem with their Abu Dhabi ownership. He didn’t go as far as elaborating on the United Arab Emirates’ own war in Yemen and increasing pivot towards Russia, and the long-term problems they may cause, but it was a landmark moment. It forced a mainstream audience to confront discussions that had been bubbling under the surface. Officials at some clubs were said to be “livid”. There was at least some “unease” within the Premier League.

The game knows it has a problem coming. More progressive voices see it as a huge opportunity.

“This is the moment,” one prominent source says, “for both the Premier League and the Football Association. This is the chance.”

The big question, as Neville argued, is whether the sport is equipped to address it. Is there the vision? Is there the foresight? Or, will it all just get kicked into the foreground again, until the next periodic crisis that pushes the game that bit closer to the reckoning everyone knows is coming.

The initial signs, from speaking to a variety of sources for this piece, don’t indicate any kind of huge shift.

In public, the Premier League’s director of policy and corporate affairs Helen MacNamara made some of the right noises when speaking to the government select committee on Monday. She confirmed they’d been in talks with Amnesty about human rights provisions, and said the competition are keen “the gateway tests can be strengthened”. That’s encouraging but vague.

That’s partly because, in private, the Premier League are still formulating ideas. “There is a much greater awareness of all this now,” one source says. Another description was that “the scales have fallen from people’s eyes”.

That doesn’t necessarily mean the clearest vision follows.

The general mood is that there is no will for great change. Chief executive Richard Masters would rather oversee than overhaul. For all the fuss about potential human rights provisions, The Independent has been told that the main solution currently being considered is an adoption of the EU registry.

“That would be a pretty low bar,” one source says. “It would still allow almost anybody bar oligarchs, and that’s only from the last few weeks.”

The clubs are meanwhile never going to vote for changes, because they don’t want to further erode a small field of potential buyers.

That sums up the core problem, and how much of this comes from what the Premier League is and how it has developed.

Former chief executive Richard Scudamore set a philosophy where the competition was going to be a truly global league, encouraging investment from anywhere, and that in a country deliberately structured to do the same. Scudamore’s own belief was the market would sort it out. Oh that’s happened alright. It’s just the market isn’t an entirely independent force either, as the Chelsea case has proved. Before that, this atmosphere was only amplified by a Conservative government, the dynamic reaching a peak with how the politics of Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Britain framed the Newcastle takeover.

Sources within the Premier League point to how that process still took a fractious two years despite the criticism, and that the green light ultimately came from legal precedence. The problem with a moment that just represented a continuation of what went before is that it also became a landmark in itself.

If it is the Saudi bid that is put forward with Chelsea, for example, the Newcastle takeover would – absurdly – make it all impossible to stop. It would be very difficult to point to overt state influence as a concern when they had already accepted “legally binding assurances” that PIF was separate from that state.

So, the situation may just get worse, rather than better. There is never that line, in the way the game truly needs. Some figures within football already talk of how Masters was “like a rabbit in the headlights” with the Newcastle takeover.

The Premier League may well reach reductio ad absurdum, a point of absurdity it can’t work past. The great irony would be if it starts to damage the international image of the competition.

The Premier League would again just have to react too late, in the way it always does. That has been one of the problems.

Figures connected to the competition argue that’s just the nature of the beast, and you can only adapt to situations as they arise. They point to how regulations have been changed in the aftermath of cases like Carson Yeung at Birmingham City, as well as the collapses of Leeds United and Portsmouth.

“What you will find is regulatory framework is often behind regulatory needs,” one source says.

There will then be changes after Abramovich, but they will not be drastic.

“There’ll be more checks and balances,” the source adds. “It won’t be wholesale blocks against investment funds or states or high-net worth individuals.”

Other involved individuals argue this just shows a stasis in thinking at the same time the world changes all around them.

Worse, even if there were reformers in English football, none have the remit. The game is too fractured, with everything in the slipstream of the Premier League, and the Premier League controlled by the clubs. That’s the nature of the beast alright but, now, in terms of ownership, that beast is Frankenstein’s monster. It’s gone too far to control. The ownership decisions already taken mean the Premier League has little choice as regards decisions of the future.

Many in the body just argue this is simply correct procedure. Scudamore himself used to say you couldn’t have a “cut of the jib test”, where takeovers were decided upon depending on what felt right. Everything has to be legally defensible.

It just means the legal constraints are always catching up.

The hope is that isn’t the case with the “golden share”. The idea, where fans would have a veto on issues of club heritage like the badge and colours, was one of the main recommendations of Tracey Crouch’s fan-led review. It’s just it hasn’t actually been implemented yet.

The Independent has been told the government won’t make it a condition of the takeover, but there is a hope the momentum behind the review and pressure from the Chelsea Supporters Trust will make a difference.

“We have made it explicitly clear to the DCMS that the recommendations of the review must be included in any sale, including a golden share for fans,” a statement from the Trust read.

“The sale of Chelsea FC represents a fantastic opportunity for the Government to show that they are actually serious about improving football governance for the benefit of supporters.”

It’s still possible this takeover may fall into a regulatory limbo in that regard, albeit one that has already been four months long. That is how long it’s been since the review’s publication.

It isn’t unfeasible that limbo for Chelsea could go on, too. Many other Premier League officials are agitating to see what next.

There is still “soreness” over the Newcastle takeover. Some want Chelsea to pay for what is seen as years of unfair advantage.

It means there isn’t actually that room to manoeuvre. If Chelsea are sold too cheaply, it will be seen as anti-competitive. If the £1.5bn debt to Abramovich is written off, there will be arguments about a points deduction. On the other side, however, there will be complaints if anyone too rich comes in. That won’t be seen as any kind of penalty at all.

Some of this is undeniably driven by self-interest, and that illustrates how difficult any kind of clear path is.

“We are at a turning point in English football,” said Nigel Huddleston, under-secretary for the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS).

The problem is that the interests are so labyrinthine that there may be a further 50 turning points after that. That’s what we saw with the Super League. It’s like the game moves ever closer to a reckoning that still hasn’t come, but perpetually puts off what must be done to avoid it.

With this, no one actually believes that states or quasi-state organisations will be prohibited from buying clubs. The moment won’t come.

What happens next with Chelsea will tell us much, but will be very far from the final say.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Mon Mar 21, 2022 12:58 pm

Interesting Editorial from Yesterdays Observer - many will know I have long been critical of that Crouch review and very sceptical of just what an Independent regulator can achieve in the Premier League in the face of of FIFA and UEFA and their ever growing dependence on revenues from the club game - for clubs participating in UEFA competitions can add as much as 60% to broadcast revenues (and that is growing), 30% to matchday revenues and benefit from hugely superior commercial incomes - add the attraction of regular participation being essential to the best players (and their wages/transfer fees) and it is a self fulfilling prophecy for many. No Independent regulator can change that or the horrendous coefficient payments that reinforce the sense of entitlement we saw create the Super League

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfr ... -a-divorce

The Guardian view on geopolitics and the Premier League: time for a divorce
Editorial

The government must swiftly implement the Crouch review recommendations and introduce an independent regulator for football


Sun 20 Mar 2022 18.30 GMT
From the future of the global economy to energy security and defence spending, the shock of Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine is provoking a dizzying rethink of policy priorities and assumptions. The Roman Abramovich-related crisis at Chelsea FC might seem a minor subplot when tectonic plates of such magnitude are shifting. But football’s global reach and modern geopolitical dimensions make it much more than that. The perfectly timed spectacle of last week’s fixture between sanctioned Chelsea and Newcastle United – owned by Riyadh’s sovereign wealth fund – marked a moral nadir for the game, coming one day after Saudi Arabia executed 81 people. It was also shaming for this country. In football, too, a paradigm shift is needed.

The tools to effect this – or at least start the job now – are within the government’s grasp. Last April, six leading clubs attempted to join the reviled European Super League project; the horror of their own supporters demonstrated an underlying outrage among fans at the direction the sport has taken. The government set up the fan-led Crouch review on football governance. (As the review panel deliberated on where the game had lost its way, the Premier League waved through the takeover of Newcastle by the fund, chaired by the crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman.)

Published in November, the review calls for the establishment of an independent regulator of the game. The independent regulator for English football (IREF) would be able to examine new potential owners according to various criteria, including an “integrity test”; the judgment would be one of whether prospective buyers would be “suitable custodians of vital community assets”. Tracey Crouch, the Conservative MP who is chair of the review panel, believes that had an integrity test been in place at the time of the Newcastle takeover, better “stress-testing” would have taken place.

The Premier League has resisted the proposal (one club director denounced it as “Maoism”). But oligarchs, authoritarian states and – in the case of the Glazer family at Manchester United – asset-strippers, have run rings round the league’s own “fit and proper” test for ownership. This was originally designed to weed out small-time fraudsters and charlatans at lower league level, but has merely operated as a fig leaf of respectability while the game changed beyond recognition. The extraordinary influx of wealth has been amorally treated as a boon for everyone lucky enough to be associated with the richest league in the world.

The unprecedented turmoil of the last fortnight should strengthen the government’s resolve to follow up on Ms Crouch’s recommendations. They should be in the next Queen’s speech, and a specific human rights dimension should be incorporated into the IREF’s role. Legislation to introduce a regulator would help to ensure the kind of protection appropriate to cherished national institutions. Politicians often talk about footballers’ responsibility to be role models; what about the clubs themselves? Other Crouch measures – such as a fans’ golden share giving a veto over matters vital to the identity of a club, including the stadium’s location and team colours – would begin to restore a democratic balance between the aristocrats who run clubs and the serfs who fill them.

The fate of Chelsea is now subject to a bidding war. But all the focus has been on the wealth of the various corporate entities and hedge funds involved rather than what is best for the fans and the wider game. All but a few hundred Chelsea supporters were excluded on Saturday from attending a classic English football occasion – the FA Cup quarter-final at Middlesbrough – because their sanctioned club is for the time being unable to sell tickets. The ultimate outcome of the deeply unedifying episode that began when Mr Abramovich bought the club in 2003 must be a moral recalibration in the governance of the game.

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Incidentally tonight sees Sky broadcast a new documentary about Super League - the link takes you through the paywall

https://12ft.io/proxy?q=https%3A%2F%2Fw ... forward%2F

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Mon Mar 21, 2022 1:32 pm

and just to show where all the money is (like you didn't know)

here is the Deloitte Money League 2022 - the 25th edition is somewhat later than usual

Here is the web based summary and walk through https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/s ... eague.html

Here is the full report https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/D ... dfml22.pdf

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Paul Waine » Mon Mar 21, 2022 5:06 pm

This article is interesting within the context of the MMT thread, not so much because it's about bidders for Chelsea, but because it explains how even fans/season ticket holders (wealthy ones, of course) are still looking for a profit when they buy a club.

I've picked out what I see as key points in bold. It's possible that some of these same business strategy points also underlie ALK's investment in Burnley.

Entirely British-backed bid joins race to buy Chelsea

Henry Winter, Chief Football Writer, Sunday March 20 2022, 7.00pm, The Times

A British-funded bid driven by Chelsea season-ticket holders revealed on Sunday that it has made an offer to buy the club. The London-based asset management firm, Centricus, has teamed up with hedge fund manager Jonathan Lourie of Cheyne Capital, and Talis Capital’s Bob Finch, formerly majority shareholder of FC Nordsjaelland in Denmark, to submit a bid.

Lourie, Finch and Centricus’ co-founder Nizar Al-Bassam and CEO Garth Ritchie are all long-standing season-ticket holders at Stamford Bridge and made their proposal on Friday to Raine Group, who are organising the sale of Chelsea following the UK government’s sanctioning of club owner Roman Abramovich over his links with Vladimir Putin.

In speaking publicly for the first time about their ambitions for Chelsea, the British-funded bidders emphasised that they would want to use Chelsea as a parent club to other clubs in the world and would keep Marina Granovskaia, the highly regarded club director, unless the government felt it inappropriate given her association with Abramovich.

The group, which is one of six significant bidders for the club, including the favourites led by US businessman Todd Boehly, hopes for a swift resolution to the situation which has caused such uncertainty at the club. “There’s a clock ticking because the club is bleeding money at a faster rate than it should be while there’s uncertainty there,” Al-Bassam said via Zoom on Sunday afternoon.

“I’ve had the same seats in the Tambling suite and the same seats in the West Stand for ten years. I’m worried for the staff there when I see this turmoil. We see the same people hosting us when we walk in. They’re amazing to us. We see the same people in the stands looking after us and I’m feeling for them.”

Lourie sits in the family stand with his four young children while Finch attended the 1970 FA Cup final against Leeds United, is a member of the Chelsea Pitch Owners with his three sons and has been a season-ticket holder for more than 25 years. Finch owns Raynes Park Vale FC.

“We’ve tried to focus on a proposal which align the ownership of the club with long-term investors with a deep history with the club,” Al-Bassam added. “If you look at the proposal we put forward, keeping it an entirely British finance proposal is core to that.

“There are plenty of very successful clubs financed by international investors but in this case after two decades of exceptional success by the club (under Abramovich’s investment), the club has the fanbase with the resources (like Lourie and Finch) to support the club to maintain that success. That’s what’s very unique about this proposal.”

Centricus, which has invested in technology companies, financial services and leisure companies, has advised Fifa and Uefa over funding in the past, and has access to significant funds.

“We oversee £40 billion assets,” Al-Bassam added. “We’ve been focused on content for a number of years, the Fifa work, the Uefa work, is all built around our view that content is a very, very dominant aspect of technology going forward and sports is a very core, key aspect of content.

Chelsea have become available after the UK government linked Abramovich with Putin and the Russian president’s invasion of Ukraine. “We can’t forget of course the bigger picture, the sad picture,” Al-Bassam emphasised.

“We’ve looked at the club in the past. There have been occasions where there were rumours of the club being available but ultimately all those projects were shelved.

“Our bid is all domestic, we don’t have any foreign investors so we’re using domestic capital which I think is quite noteworthy. We all attend the matches with our kids.”

But it is a pure business venture. “I don’t think any of us are coming purely because we’re fans or purely because we love football,” Al-Bassam added. “It’s really driven by the commercial opportunities. But it is a long-term investment. For us, you simply can’t buy a club and expect to sell it in five or ten years. The expectations from the fans, the regulators, be it the FA or Premier League or from the Government, would be not to have a sale of this club in the next five or ten years.

“So this would have to be a very, very long-term commitment. The commitment just around either a stadium expansion or a new stadium is a half-decade commitment and that needs to be done in consultation with the community, the council and with fans.”

Ritchie, who was also on the Zoom call, said, “Chelsea are one of the very few unique iconic global brands that has come about by unfortunate circumstances, and that’s not lost on us, but the commercial opportunity around an iconic global name in a sport that is continuing to grow means there has to be commercial viability here.

“We have experience of managing big and complex organisations. We are regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. Not only do you have the FA making sure you don’t do anything wrong, you also have the FCA making sure you stay in your swim lane.

“We would definitely want to invest in the company, the players and surroundings. It’s why we keep talking about having ‘patient’ capital. The people supporting us have deep pockets of capital. Us being fans, we want to win and we need to invest and if we win the brand continues to grow back.”

The British group believe it can generate more commercial revenues from match-day, media and sponsorship and from owning other clubs, including development of talent. “It involves investing in in clubs on a global basis in order to have the facilities to be able to manage talent,” Al-Bassam said. “The advantage of being able to invest in an MLS club, a Portuguese division two club, a club in Australia or Asia opens your horizons to being able to manage youth development.

“Chelsea has one of the largest loan books out there, they have a huge amount of talent, they recruit a lot of youth, they have a very big network clearly that can be leveraged.

“The price of what Chelsea will be acquired for at the peak today versus some of the cost of those other clubs to join the network could be quite attractive.

“So there is a business angle to this but the most important thing to remember is Chelsea’s not broken today. We think Chelsea’s well-managed fundamentally under sporting and business side.”

Al-Bassam, who emphasised his group was “not supporters of the European Super League”, acknowledged that the Raine Group had a “challenging” task in selecting even the shortlist.

“They are running an incredibly complex process,” Ritchie added. “It’s not simply the winner is the best price. The SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission in the US) will look at how it is run, as will the FCA and HM government.

“We’ve certainly passed the fit and proper person’s test for the FCA. We wouldn’t be bidding if we thought we weren’t competent in being great custodians for this great football club.”

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Tue Mar 22, 2022 11:15 pm

Interesting stuff from Tariq Panja in the New York Times about possible new financial regulation from UEFA - sounds an awful lot like the Amortisation + Salary to Revenue ration I was suggesting they would be moving to last summer

https://archive.ph/OLupK#selection-297.0-637.275

Soccer’s Richest Clubs Sidestep Salary Caps in New Cost Controls
UEFA’s new financial regulations will tie spending to club revenues, entrenching the advantages wealthy clubs already enjoy in the market for talent.

By Tariq Panja March 22, 2022, 1:32 p.m. ET

The biggest reforms of European soccer’s financial controls in a generation will stop short of creating U.S.-style salary caps to restrain teams’ spending, and instead will enact rules that are unlikely to stop the continent’s richest clubs from buying up the best talent and winning the most coveted trophies.

UEFA, European soccer’s governing body, has spent more than a year in talks with a representative group for elite clubs about a new model to replace its so-called financial fair play rules, the cost-control mechanism that has for a decade sought to limit team expenditures as part of an effort to promote competition.

UEFA has finally alighted on a replacement. Teams’ soccer-related spending, according to people briefed on the regulations, will not be able to surpass 70 percent of their income, a regulation that appears watered down from the strict salary cap that had long been championed by UEFA’s president, Aleksander Ceferin.

Ceferin had for at least five years discussed imposing salary caps as a way to address European soccer’s growing wealth gap. But faced with the complexities of European employment law and deep-pocketed opposition, UEFA has abandoned the concept of a hard cap and, according to three people familiar with the proposals, settled on a proposal that — after a three-year implementation period — will require teams to keep their spending within a strict ratio.

The rules will be added to UEFA’s rule book after a vote of its executive board on April 7. They will also be renamed, with UEFA looking to move away from F.F.P., or financial fair play, a term coined under Ceferin’s predecessor, and instead adopt a more prosaic title: financial sustainability regulations.

In more than a decade of use, the current financial fair play system has proved more adept at producing critics than fairness. Smaller teams complained that they were punished for rule breaches while bigger, wealthier teams were often able to avoid the most severe penalties. The biggest and richest clubs, meanwhile, objected to the financial controls as an unfair curb on their ambitions.

Talks about changing the regulations accelerated during the coronavirus pandemic, when shuttered stadiums and rebates to television broadcasters caused financial unease for teams big and small. UEFA reported in February that an estimated 7 billion euros (about $7.7 billion) had been collectively wiped off clubs’ balance sheets during the pandemic.

Despite their lofty nod to sustainability, the rules changes may in fact entrench the growing hegemony of wealthy English teams, which benefit not only from the highest domestic television revenues in global soccer but also access to the wealth of some of the richest owners in sports. In last season’s Champions League, two English teams met in the final for the second time in three years.

The move to bring soccer-related costs like wages and transfer fees into a tight ratio will be a challenge for many major teams outside England, the vast majority of which have struggled to maintain fiscal discipline as they tried to keep up with rivals who play in the Premier League.

In Italy, for example, wage costs alone often exceed the ratios being proposed by UEFA. In Spain, which has some of the strictest financial rules in soccer, the powerhouse team Barcelona was unable to retain the star player Lionel Messi last year because doing so would have breached a cap imposed on the team by the league.

Discussions about the ratio UEFA should impose on clubs were complicated by conflicting interests. Some teams, particularly those backed by wealthy owners used to pumping their own cash into buying success for their teams, had wanted the limit to be as high as 85 percent. Others, including several German clubs, whose balance sheets are typically kept under control by a system in which members retain a majority stake in ownership, argued for an even lower limit.

To allow the teams to adjust to the new regulations, the new rules will be imposed over time: Clubs will be able to spend up to 90 percent of their revenues before that figure will be brought to its permanent 70 percent level within three seasons. According to the proposed rules, teams may under certain circumstances be allowed the flexibility to spend up to about $10 million above the ratio, provided they have healthy balance sheets and have not breached regulations before.
UEFA’s critics have long complained that while they have had cost-control rules in place, they have often failed to punish the biggest teams. In recent years, Manchester City and Paris St.-Germain — teams bankrolled by wealthy Gulf States — have been able to avoid severe penalties on technical grounds.

There has also been little clarity around the current punishment mechanism, and concerns about UEFA’s appetite to take on the hardest cases. Several longstanding members of the panels overseeing the financial rules have either been replaced or walked out in recent years. Sunil Gulati, the former U.S. Soccer president, last year was named chairman of UEFA’s revamped financial control panel.

Under the new system, UEFA will have the right to impose both sporting and financial penalties for rule breakers, including fines, threat of expulsion and, for the first time, an option for demoting teams between the three competitions it currently operates. A team in the Champions League, for example, could be relegated to the second-tier Europa League for a financial rules breach.

Another measure may also include point deductions under the revised format of the Champions League and the Europa League: Starting in 2024 all participants will be placed in a single league table during the first phase of the competition. And the regulations also will require greater scrutiny of sponsorship deals amid claims that some teams have benefited from inflated agreements with companies linked to their ownership groups.

UEFA is talking about the proposals with several clubs that are already on performance plans because of their poor financial records. Those teams, as many as 40, made so-called settlement agreements with the governing body in order to keep participating in their tournaments.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Wed Mar 23, 2022 1:07 am

the academic article by Simon Chadwick at the top of this page proved too much for some

here Chadwick presents an online seminar inspired by that article - it is far more accessible, the seminar itself last about 70 minutes with a Q&A after it

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZhkR8XC88o

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Wed Mar 23, 2022 5:33 pm

Interesting things happening at Stoke City

This is ostensibly the same Stole City who in 1901 complained that Liverpool were exercising an unfair advantage in their title winning campaign paying payers £7 per week with a further £3 in bonuses - it led to the imposition of the Maximum wage at £4 per week the following season. I have no information if Liverpool operated at a loss or profit that season.

today Stoke City announced a plot of financial doping which falls within the laws of the game - they have been struggling with FFP and the share conversion you will read about helps with that - it is likely to be the maximum allowed for the period under Profit and Sustainability rules

CLUB STATEMENT
By Stoke City FC


Stoke City’s owners, bet365 Group, have underlined their continuing long-term commitment to the Club and its funding by reducing the debts of the Club’s holding company by £160million.

The Club’s owners have converted £40million of shareholder loans into equity in Stoke City Holdings Limited and have also waived £120million of shareholder loans.

Joint Chairman John Coates said: “Converting £40m of loans into equity and waiving £120m of loans greatly strengthens the Club’s balance sheet and also provides more long-term stability for the Club.

“On the field, the last four or five years have not proved to be as successful as any of us would have hoped. However, our commitment to the Club, its future success, financial sustainability and place at the heart of our local community remains as strong and focussed as ever.”

The debt reduction follows the Club’s recent announcement that a £20m five-year redevelopment programme at the bet365 Stadium and Clayton Wood training ground is to get underway this summer.

More than £4million will be invested in facilities ahead of the 2022/23 season, including the installation of 8,400 seats.

Other work to be carried out this summer includes the complete transformation of Delilah’s Bar into a contemporary sports bar, installation of new toilet facilities in the Tile Mountain and South Stands, refurbishment of the Players’ and Stanley Matthews Lounges and installation of a new synthetic, all-weather pitch at Clayton Wood to be used by first-team, Academy line-ups and women’s side.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by RVclaret » Wed Mar 23, 2022 5:36 pm

Wow - 160m of debt wiped out, just like that. What the hell is the point of FFP.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Wed Mar 23, 2022 6:17 pm

RVclaret wrote:
Wed Mar 23, 2022 5:36 pm
Wow - 160m of debt wiped out, just like that. What the hell is the point of FFP.
still, it's less than half of the the owners daughters average annual income from Bet365 in the last few years

The real question is can they alter their spending habits - Bolton couldn't when Eddie Davies wrote that £180m off - look where that got them

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Thu Mar 24, 2022 7:57 pm

This is an interesting discussion - including a lot on why people buy Premier League clubs and a bit on valuation

The SportsProPodcast

https://podfollow.com/689306502/episode ... bf078/view

Episode notes
The Athletic football news reporter Matt Slater returns to join Eoin Connolly and SportsPro digital editor Tom Bassam and cover a busy week in the soccer business.

As the Raine Group receives plenty of bids for Chelsea, discussion centres on an accelerated sales process at Stamford Bridge and what lies ahead for the English soccer giants, as well as asking what influence the prospective new owners could have on the wider game.

They also reflect on a Deloitte Money League table that has Manchester City at the top for the first time and tells a story of the Premier League’s financial dominance.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Fri Mar 25, 2022 2:20 pm

Another fascinating podcast - this weeks business of Sport podcast from the Athletic with Matt Slaterand Simon Chadwick- it opens with discussion of Saudi Arabia and Sport

https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/c ... 0555073084

the blurb - The Athletic's Matt Slater speaks to Chris Isitt chair of Chelsea Pitch Owners - the company that holds the freehold of Stamford Bridge stadium - as the sales process for Premier League Chelsea Football Club continues. Isitt tell Matt, CPO have been in communication with groups who have made heavily fancied bids.

Matt is also joined by Professor Simon Chadwick an expert on sport and geopolitics, to look at the impact of investment from Saudi Arabia in a range of sports including football, boxing, WWE, golf and Formula One rolls into Jeddah this weekend..

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Fri Mar 25, 2022 3:08 pm

Another Podcast - this time unofficial Partner look at 777 Partners - it gives a great overview of what American Investors are wanting to do in sport

https://www.unofficialpartner.com/podca ... 7-partners

blurb
Today we’re asking what does 777 Partners, a Miami based private investment firm, see in professional British basketball?
The company has recently bought 45% of the British Basketball League for $7million, having already bought up the London Lions franchise.
This is part of a bigger move in to sports investment. 777 recently paid US$137 million for a 70 per cent in Vasco da Gama, which values the Brazilian club at US$333m, following on from other investments in La Liga club Sevilla and Serie A side, Genoa.

So we talk the person Lenz Balan, who is Vice President at 777 and one of the people leading their move in to sport.

Joining Lenz is Peter Hawkings, who is sports investment lead at Portas Consulting.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Fri Mar 25, 2022 3:34 pm

and for those still not sure about sport and geopolitics - here from the Financial Times
https://archive.ph/mHMmY

Putin approved Abramovich’s role in Russia-Ukraine talks
Direct blessing underscores close ties between Russian president and oligarch


Max Seddon in Riga, Roman Olearchyk in Kyiv, and Arash Massoudi in London 2 HOURS AGO

Vladimir Putin personally approved Roman Abramovich’s involvement in Russia’s peace talks with Ukraine, according to two people with direct knowledge of the matter.

Putin’s direct blessing indicates that Abramovich sought approval at the highest level to help start ceasefire negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow in late February and runs counter to long-running claims by the oligarch that he does not have a close relationship with the Russian president.

After receiving Putin’s backing, Abramovich met a senior official from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s office to help set up the talks, three people said.

Since then, the two sides have started discussing a tentative plan to cease Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — although Ukraine and its western allies fear Moscow may be using the talks as a ploy to buy time for its troops to regroup and lead a renewed ground offensive.

The two people with knowledge of the matter said Putin signalled his approval after Abramovich had suggested to the Kremlin that he play a mediating role. “He does indeed have approval from the highest level on both sides,” one of the people said.

The other added: “It’s a big risk for him. But he said, ‘I want to do something’. Putin is unpredictable and can get furious – it’s always very risky. And it brings a lot of attention, which is dangerous.”

Western officials briefed on the progress of the talks have cast doubt on whether Abramovich even played a role. Others have suggested he might have tried to overstate his efforts in an attempt to prevent becoming a target for western sanctions and losing control of his UK-based assets, including Chelsea Football Club.

The Russian billionaire has since been targeted by EU and UK sanctions. Zelensky pleaded for the US not to include the billionaire in its own blacklist because of his supposed role as a go-between in the ceasefire discussions, according to the Wall Street Journal.

For decades Abramovich has sought to avoid being associated with Putin, under whom he served as governor of the remote province of Chukotka on the Bering Strait from 2000 until 2008.

He did not attend a roundtable Putin held for oligarchs and state company bosses the evening after the Ukraine invasion began on February 24. In 2003, he told the Financial Times he had “no special relationship” with Putin.

But when it decided to freeze his assets, the EU said that Abramovich’s connection to the Russian president “helped him to maintain his considerable wealth”.

David Arakhamia, head of Zelensky’s party in parliament and a member of Ukraine’s negotiating team in talks with Russia, said he met Abramovich in Gomel, Belarus, when the first round of talks took place.

“I can confirm that Mr Abramovich is heavily involved in peace talks,” Arakhamia told the FT. The billionaire “came into the process through the international Jewish community”, he added.

Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov declined to comment on whether Abramovich had received the go-ahead from Putin himself. Peskov said on Thursday that the businessman had played a role in organising the talks, adding: “Now talks are taking place between the two negotiating teams — the Russians and the Ukrainians.”

In recent weeks, as the two sides held talks online to avoid the Ukrainian delegation making a dangerous day-long trip to Belarus via Poland, Abramovich has focused his efforts on humanitarian issues as well as trying to arrange meetings with foreign mediators, according to the people with knowledge on the matter.

He met former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder in Moscow earlier this month, alongside Vladimir Medinsky, the head of Russia’s delegation at the talks. His private jet has been pictured making stops in Israel and Turkey, whose leaders have also been involved as mediators in the negotiations.

“He’s trying to do what he can,” one of the people close to the billionaire insisted.

While in Turkey, Abramovich met Ibrahim Kalin, a senior foreign policy adviser to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, according to a person with knowledge of the meeting. Two superyachts belonging to Abramovich docked on the country’s southern coast this week. Erdogan’s office declined to comment and Kalin did not respond to a request for comment.

An official for Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett denied Abramovich played a role in securing Israel’s involvement.

A spokesperson for Abramovich said it was “not helpful commenting on the process” of those talks, or on Abramovich’s involvement, for the sake of their success.

Additional reporting by Neri Zilber and Laura Pitel

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Sat Mar 26, 2022 11:55 am

Philipp Lahm in the Guardian cuts to the crux of the problem of UEFA club football, clearly demonstrating why the Super League is constantly a threat (though breadth of the initial teams fell into the same trap while acknowledging the strengths (and flaw) in the Premier League. It address all the primary issues in European club football.

https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/ ... -in-europe

Football needs to unite and create a more level playing field in Europe

Philipp Lahm
Competition authorities need to find a model for a more culturally interesting European league, not the most lucrative

Fri 25 Mar 2022 10.18 GMT
What unites us in Europe? In the current crisis, when the world is changing from a rule-based to a power-based order, Europe is moving closer together and remembering its most important principle: rules and laws apply. This has been agreed in Porto and Helsinki, Bruges and Athens, Warsaw, Prague and Ljubljana.

Football is a mosaic of social life. It contributes to negotiating and communicating values. Whether it finds acceptance and whether western society identifies with it depends on whether its competitions are fair and subject to good rules, ie whether many are allowed to participate with a chance of success.

This works surprisingly well in the national teams, measured by the fact that the size of the countries is a decisive factor for them and no one in Europe wants to change anything about the sovereignty of their borders. There have been 10 different winners in 16 European Championship tournaments.

The problem lies in club football. A lot of money flows into it, from which some leagues and teams profit disproportionately. This creates national monopolies and in the Champions League whole regions of Europe are left behind. It is now up to the competition authorities.

“People go to football because they don’t know the result,” Sepp Herberger, the West Germany World Cup-winning coach of 1954, said. This is no longer true in Germany and the situation is similar in France. The two metropolises of Munich and Paris have developed into monopolies.

Because Bayern are aiming for their 10th championship in a row, people in Germany are discussing play-offs. The title would then depend on a few games at the end of the season. This is how the Bundesliga is supposed to become exciting again. But play-offs cannot be the solution. They would only fight the symptoms, not the cause. Changing the mode does not replace the question: how do you organise competition so that football is fun and many are involved in it?

The greatest density of competition is in the Premier League, where almost all clubs are in the hands of very rich owners. However, no attention has been paid to who is allowed to finance football as a national asset. Roman Abramovich has been hit with sanctions. And the debate on how to regulate who is allowed to invest under which conditions in the future is being conducted very intensively in England. In Europe, universal human rights must be fundamental in this question.

International competition needs innovation, it needs to be reinvented regularly. The Champions League is attractive, the finals are watched by more than 100 million worldwide. But the winners of the past 11 years have come from three countries. In this century, no club from Scandinavia, the Balkans, east central Europe or eastern Europe has reached the semi-finals. The last one was Dynamo Kyiv in 1999.

Does Europe’s football consist only of England, Spain, Germany, Italy and France? What about the other nations? Do they have to be happy to play only in the preliminary round?

Benfica, for example, European Cup winners in 1961 and 1962, have a large stadium, many members and a rich tradition. The city exerts its charisma all the way to South America. Benfica are now in the quarter-finals, but because the Portuguese league is too small it is very difficult for the club to compete in the Champions League. The same can be said about Ajax.

Prague, Warsaw, Budapest and Copenhagen are also only allowed to watch as soon as the decisive phase begins. Yet these great cities would be interesting for investors who could create the framework conditions for success.

The record used to look different. The last 10 winners of the European Cup of Nations, as the Champions League was called before its introduction in 1992, came from eight countries, including Romania, Portugal, the Netherlands and Yugoslavia. This diversity has generated enthusiasm, made football socially relevant and the Champions League possible.

Europe needs to find intelligent solutions at the negotiating table – to be cooperative, willing to compromise and to take different interests into account. This includes shaping a league that offers many a chance to succeed, sportingly and economically. It is not an easy task, but it is an interesting one. Uefa and all national associations have a responsibility here, including those who finance the sport. When, if not now, is the time for reform? The desire for change and the sense of solidarity are great at the moment.

The experience with the planned Super League last year shows that if the institutions do nothing, the matter could be taken out of their hands. But if a few top clubs then set the conditions, the most lucrative model of a European league will prevail, not the most culturally interesting.

Europe has great appeal in the world because it adheres to its democratic order and stands for freedom and equality. This also applies to its sporting competitions, as long as they offer participation and equal opportunities. These are values that are constantly being rebalanced in an alliance of equal nations. The west is strengthening its cohesion in these days and weeks and football must make its contribution.

Philipp Lahm’s column appears regularly in the Guardian. It is produced in partnership with Oliver Fritsch at Zeit Online, the German online magazine, and is being published in several European countries.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Sun Mar 27, 2022 1:35 pm

Sometimes the mind just boggles

The bidders for Chelsea (the proceeds of the sale we are told are going to 'Charity' - after the current owner has written off £1.5 billion of loans - there was an extra £30m allowed last week to pay this months wages) are now being told they have to guarantee another £1 billion minimum on top of the sale price (bids stand at £2,5billion or more) for player investment and infrastructure development) - the kicker the selling agents commission is based on sale price + guaranteed investment pot - welcome to Football's Magic Money Tree.

this article is from the Telegraph and the link takes you through the paywall

https://12ft.io/proxy?q=https%3A%2F%2Fw ... towards%2F

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Paul Waine » Sun Mar 27, 2022 2:30 pm

Chester Perry wrote:
Sun Mar 27, 2022 1:35 pm
Sometimes the mind just boggles

The bidders for Chelsea (the proceeds of the sale we are told are going to 'Charity' - after the current owner has written off £1.5 billion of loans - there was an extra £30m allowed last week to pay this months wages) are now being told they have to guarantee another £1 billion minimum on top of the sale price (bids stand at £2,5billion or more) for player investment and infrastructure development) - the kicker the selling agents commission is based on sale price + guaranteed investment pot - welcome to Football's Magic Money Tree.

this article is from the Telegraph and the link takes you through the paywall

https://12ft.io/proxy?q=https%3A%2F%2Fw ... towards%2F
Hmm, if I was a bidder (I know everyone on here knows I'm not ;) ) I'd respond along the lines of "What, you are admitting that it's not all perfect, already. If another £1 billion is need for future investments, including a new/re-built ground, I'm knocking that off my bid. Maybe also asking how much have Chelsea already got in the bank, and tell them I was planning to use that to help fund my bid! ;) Plus, explain that the rest of my bid would be financed by selling off some of the first team squad and setting a maximum wage for the rest.

I assume the sanctions means that none of the proceeds of sale will be available to pay any commission to these Raine guys?

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by GodIsADeeJay81 » Sun Mar 27, 2022 2:32 pm

Paul Waine wrote:
Sun Mar 27, 2022 2:30 pm
Hmm, if I was a bidder (I know everyone on here knows I'm not ;) ) I'd respond along the lines of "What, you are admitting that it's not all perfect, already. If another £1 billion is need for future investments, including a new/re-built ground, I'm knocking that off my bid. Maybe also asking how much have Chelsea already got in the bank, and tell them I was planning to use that to help fund my bid! ;) Plus, explain that the rest of my bid would be financed by selling off some of the first team squad and setting a maximum wage for the rest.

I assume the sanctions means that none of the proceeds of sale will be available to pay any commission to these Raine guys?
On the radio the other day, they reminded people that Chelsea/Roman own a lot of property around the ground for stadium redevelopment purposes and that's included in the sale of the club.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by KRBFC » Sun Mar 27, 2022 2:42 pm

In terms of creating better competition, the proposed merge between Dutch and Belgian football sounds very good, it's not just about the top division, there will be other tiers merged too. Location wise it makes sense for fans too, Amsterdam to Bruges is only a 2 and 1/2 hour drive away. Groningen which I think is the furthest North Dutch side to Liege which I think is southern Belgium is under 4 hours drive.

Will be a very good league to watch, will blow past the French league.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Sun Mar 27, 2022 2:42 pm

GodIsADeeJay81 wrote:
Sun Mar 27, 2022 2:32 pm
On the radio the other day, they reminded people that Chelsea/Roman own a lot of property around the ground for stadium redevelopment purposes and that's included in the sale of the club.
There is also a suggestion that the apartment block next door is up for sale and that the Shopping centre above Fulham Broadway is for sale - that would provide a much more substantial opportunity to rebuild the ground and add in lucrative other development (required very deep pockets) and falls right into the the lap of someone like Nick Candy whose wealth has been built off the back of such developments
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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by GodIsADeeJay81 » Sun Mar 27, 2022 3:03 pm

KRBFC wrote:
Sun Mar 27, 2022 2:42 pm
In terms of creating better competition, the proposed merge between Dutch and Belgian football sounds very good, it's not just about the top division, there will be other tiers merged too. Location wise it makes sense for fans too, Amsterdam to Bruges is only a 2 and 1/2 hour drive away. Groningen which I think is the furthest North Dutch side to Liege which I think is southern Belgium is under 4 hours drive.

Will be a very good league to watch, will blow past the French league.
I've read about that, they believe they'd generate a lot more revenue with a combined league, making their teams more competitive in the long term in European competition

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Sun Mar 27, 2022 3:20 pm

GodIsADeeJay81 wrote:
Sun Mar 27, 2022 3:03 pm
I've read about that, they believe they'd generate a lot more revenue with a combined league, making their teams more competitive in the long term in European competition
all that is somewhere up this thread

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by KRBFC » Sun Mar 27, 2022 3:35 pm

GodIsADeeJay81 wrote:
Sun Mar 27, 2022 3:03 pm
I've read about that, they believe they'd generate a lot more revenue with a combined league, making their teams more competitive in the long term in European competition
I'd love it to happen as a viewer of Dutch football. Would be one of the most exciting leagues in world football, attacking football with some good sides.
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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Sun Mar 27, 2022 4:03 pm

KRBFC wrote:
Sun Mar 27, 2022 3:35 pm
I'd love it to happen as a viewer of Dutch football. Would be one of the most exciting leagues in world football, attacking football with some good sides.
There are a number of complicating issues - not least the number of multi-club groups, as Holland is now falling to the same takeover swarm that the Belgian league has - City Football Group have been linked to NEX Breda in the last couple of weeks - a number of others have already gone including ADO Den Haag to one of the Crystal Palace owners last month for possibly just EUR 6m, he has a Belgian club too

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by KRBFC » Sun Mar 27, 2022 4:09 pm

Chester Perry wrote:
Sun Mar 27, 2022 4:03 pm
There are a number of complicating issues - not least the number of multi-club groups, as Holland is now falling to the same takeover swarm that the Belgian league has - City Football Group have been linked to NEX Breda in the last couple of weeks - a number of others have already gone including ADO Den Haag to one of the Crystal Palace owners last month for possibly just EUR 6m, he has a Belgian club too
That's definitely an issue, It would be an interesting project to buy into though and I'm sure those clubs would garner attention from elsewhere if needed to be sold. Even though all 3 would likely be tier 2 sides to start.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Chester Perry » Sun Mar 27, 2022 4:33 pm

KRBFC wrote:
Sun Mar 27, 2022 4:09 pm
That's definitely an issue, It would be an interesting project to buy into though and I'm sure those clubs would garner attention from elsewhere if needed to be sold. Even though all 3 would likely be tier 2 sides to start.
to complicate the issue further - another major share holder in Palace owns a different Belgian club - it is not currently an issue for the Belgian FA - and Blitzer (with Harris) may yet have to sell his Palace stake if the Chelsea bid they are funding wins - strange world is football club ownership in these times

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Duffer_ » Sun Mar 27, 2022 4:57 pm

Paul Waine wrote:
Sun Mar 27, 2022 2:30 pm
Hmm, if I was a bidder (I know everyone on here knows I'm not ;) ) I'd respond along the lines of "What, you are admitting that it's not all perfect, already. If another £1 billion is need for future investments, including a new/re-built ground, I'm knocking that off my bid. Maybe also asking how much have Chelsea already got in the bank, and tell them I was planning to use that to help fund my bid! ;) Plus, explain that the rest of my bid would be financed by selling off some of the first team squad and setting a maximum wage for the rest.

I assume the sanctions means that none of the proceeds of sale will be available to pay any commission to these Raine guys?
Who or what is "Chelsea" in the context of insisting on the £1bn additional investment? Presumably it is Chairman, Bruce Buck, and the directors of Chelsea FC plc? Are these individuals sufficiently distanced and independent from Abramovich for us to feel comfortable with them being involved in this process?

It looks to me as though Abramovich's decision to sell prior to sanctions being imposed means the UK government is in danger of being out manoeuvred. The government has intervened to ensure that Abramovich doesn't benefit from the sale proceeds and granted a licence for Chelsea to operate whilst its future is resolved. It looks as though the government has stopped short of seizing the assets and making itself solely responsible for determining the procedure and objectives of the sale. These objectives could be one or more of the following:

1) to remove Russian ownership and influence from the football club;
2) to maximise the sale proceeds for the benefit of charitable organisations;
3) to ensure the future financial stability of Chelsea FC;
4) to promote meaningful fan representation in the future management of Chelsea FC; or
5) something else

The above is not meant as an exhaustive list but it is enough to demonstrate that these demands from "Chelsea" could be at odds with the government's objectives and Paul Waine's post, albeit tongue in cheek, illustrates that point.

And yet the Mirror reports Abramovich will have "the final say" on who buys Chelsea and the Raine Group appear to have been appointed by Chelsea/Abramovich before the government got involved. If the government is in control of the sale process, why would they allow excessive profiteering from the Raine Group?

It all looks a bit of a mess to me but admittedly I am not all over this story. Does anybody have clarity on who the ultimate decision makers are in the sale process? Apologies if I've missed it on this or any other thread.

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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by Paul Waine » Sun Mar 27, 2022 5:17 pm

Duffer_ wrote:
Sun Mar 27, 2022 4:57 pm
Who or what is "Chelsea" in the context of insisting on the £1bn additional investment? Presumably it is Chairman, Bruce Buck, and the directors of Chelsea FC plc? Are these individuals sufficiently distanced and independent from Abramovich for us to feel comfortable with them being involved in this process?

It looks to me as though Abramovich's decision to sell prior to sanctions being imposed means the UK government is in danger of being out manoeuvred. The government has intervened to ensure that Abramovich doesn't benefit from the sale proceeds and granted a licence for Chelsea to operate whilst its future is resolved. It looks as though the government has stopped short of seizing the assets and making itself solely responsible for determining the procedure and objectives of the sale. These objectives could be one or more of the following:

1) to remove Russian ownership and influence from the football club;
2) to maximise the sale proceeds for the benefit of charitable organisations;
3) to ensure the future financial stability of Chelsea FC;
4) to promote meaningful fan representation in the future management of Chelsea FC; or
5) something else

The above is not meant as an exhaustive list but it is enough to demonstrate that these demands from "Chelsea" could be at odds with the government's objectives and Paul Waine's post, albeit tongue in cheek, illustrates that point.

And yet the Mirror reports Abramovich will have "the final say" on who buys Chelsea and the Raine Group appear to have been appointed by Chelsea/Abramovich before the government got involved. If the government is in control of the sale process, why would they allow excessive profiteering from the Raine Group?

It all looks a bit of a mess to me but admittedly I am not all over this story. Does anybody have clarity on who the ultimate decision makers are in the sale process? Apologies if I've missed it on this or any other thread.
Hi Duffer, I make no claim to understand the sanctions applying to Russians, particularly, no detailed understanding with respect to Abramovich and Chelsea FC. I believe that the sanctions only freeze the assets. at this time, and they aren't confiscation orders. I think we also all know that Chelsea FC has been granted a "special license" to continue operating, including £X amount for away games and that they were stopped from selling tickets and replica kit.

Rightly or wrongly, Raine have been chosen by RA to sell the club. Executives of the club (excluding RA) are involved in the assessment of bidders. Once they have a preferred purchaser, they will present this prospective new owner to the Government (I'm not sure whether the Premier League would decide "fit and proper" before hand or after the Gov't has approved...). If/when a new owner is ready to proceed the sale proceeds will be received and be frozen along with all other RA assets. I don't think there's anything in the sanctions that has already decided that the sale proceeds will be used for any charitable purposes. If that was to happen I'd imagine it would be something that would be sorted much later.
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Re: Football's Magic Money Tree

Post by KRBFC » Sun Mar 27, 2022 5:25 pm

Chester Perry wrote:
Sun Mar 27, 2022 4:33 pm
to complicate the issue further - another major share holder in Palace owns a different Belgian club - it is not currently an issue for the Belgian FA - and Blitzer (with Harris) may yet have to sell his Palace stake if the Chelsea bid they are funding wins - strange world is football club ownership in these times
Which Belgian club do they own? I thought it was Molenbeek who Ntumbu Massanka played for

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